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THE CASE FOR CONSUMER-ORIENTED
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY
AND DISCLOSURE
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer*
It is legally impossible to offer securities to the public without giving
thorough and exhaustive disclosures, allowing potential buyers to compare
such securities with competing investment options. But it is legally
possible to offer the public any other product under the wide wings of the
freedom of commercial speech.
This article calls for corporate informational accountability towards
consumers by setting affirmative disclosure standards and requirements on
corporations that offer products or services to the public. The article
compares product choice to investment allocation, arguing that the choice
process, product complexity, and risks are often higher for consumers than
for investors. This article also compares the consumer product market to
the capital markets, showing that, while investors are aided in their analysis
of information by investment advisors and other intermediaries, consumers
typically undertake their product research and make their choices unaided.
Thus, despite the abundance of commercial speech, markets fail to provide
consumers with the requisite information to make an efficient choice, and
they overwhelm consumers with an overload of information.
Therefore, this article argues that the informational rights of
consumers should be as well protected as the informational rights of
investors. Corporate law is established as the doctrinal setting for product
disclosures, offering an extension of the scope of current corporate
governance by applying stakeholder theory to consumers as corporate
members. Finally, corporate law accountability standards are shown to be
superior to the current contractarian view towards accountability for
product information. Three essential standards for corporate disclosure
accountability towards consumers are suggested, including a duty of

* This Article is based on a doctoral dissertation written at Tel Aviv University–Buchman
Faculty of Law, and on research performed at Harvard Law School as a Visiting Researcher.
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INTRODUCTION
When offering securities to the United States public, corporations
must comply with an exclusive informational regime that allows speech
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only within the uniform boundaries determined by the Securities &
Exchange Commission.1 Corporations must use a standardized method for
financial audits and reports, and disclose in plain and simple English any
material fact of interest to a potential buyer.2 But when offering the public
other products, corporations are entitled to speak freely to consumers as
they wish, under the wide wings of the freedom of commercial speech,
constrained only by the ban on misrepresentation and fraud.3 Why are
1. The Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982), regulates the
public offering and sale of securities in interstate commerce and requires a prospectus
designed to provide all material information necessary to investors to fully assess the merits
and risks of the purchased security. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934 Act”),
15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982), requires all registrants to file periodic reports with the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) in electronic format through the Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. See also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET 73-100 (3d ed. 2003) (observing the events and hearings that shaped the
development of the early securities acts and markets following the depression); William O.
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE L. REV. 521, 522 (1934) (criticizing the
Securities Act for, among other things, assuming that the public’s intake of information will
give investors needed protection).
2. Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act Release
No. 39,593, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,011, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6,
1998). The SEC has legal authority to establish financial accounting and reporting
standards for publicly held companies under the 1934 Act.
3. The Supreme Court demonstrates an eclectic approach to the protection of
commercial speech, subjecting regulation interfering with free advertising to various
degrees of constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has upheld such regulation, but has
also struck such regulation down based on First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1994) (holding unconstitutional under the First
Amendment the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, which prohibited beer labels from
displaying alcohol content); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
430-31 (1993) (striking down a ban on the placement of commercial newsracks on city
streets and holding that the City had not met its burden of establishing a reasonable fit
between its legitimate interests in aesthetics of streets and the means it chose to serve these
interests); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 (1993)(holding unconstitutional under the
First Amendment the Florida Board of Accountancy’s rule that prohibited accountants from
engaging in direct, in-person, uninvited solicitations). The resulting policy differentiates the
constitutional protection of commercial speech into two subcategories. The first regards
regulation of false or misleading commercial speech, and the second regards regulation of
commercial speech in all other cases. The purpose of freedom of commercial speech is to
protect the dissemination of truthful commercial information, in an effort to ensure that the
public is “intelligent and well informed.” Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). The Supreme Court does not typically
extend constitutional protection to restrictions of commercial speech designed to achieve
ends other than the dissemination of truthful information. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (striking down a Rhode Island law that banned
advertisement of alcohol prices in an effort to reduce demand for alcohol). While the First
Amendment is now considered to protect the dissemination of truthful and non-misleading
commercial communications about lawful products and services, the State is authorized to
regulate potentially deceptive or overreaching advertising more freely than other forms of
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investors better protected than consumers? Why does our legal system
choose to provide consumers of investments better information to secure
their freedom of choice?
The answers lie in the limited scope of current corporate law.
Consumers are not considered corporate stakeholders entitled to
informational accountability. Rather, consumers are a weak and voiceless
party to a contractual relationship with the corporate seller. The consumer
capacity is therefore restricted by the terms of the contract, which is
determined unilaterally by the seller. In 2014, corporations offering
merchandise or services to the public enjoy the status of small merchants in
the archaic marketplace. They need to provide consumers with information
only to the extent necessary to render the agreement voluntary, as required
under contract law. Consumers of securities, on the other hand, are labeled
"investors" and are considered prominent corporate stakeholders. Offering
securities to the public invokes an informational regime that requires
periodic and immediate uniform disclosures, including all material
information in plain English, accompanied by standardized financial audits
and reports.4
Current corporate law does not acknowledge consumers as legitimate
corporate stakeholders and does not impose any duty towards consumers.
Corporate accountability is reserved to the shareholders or to the
corporation itself as a whole.5 Board members are agents appointed by
speech. The resulting constitutional scrutiny standard regarding regulation of such speech is
minimal, “less than strict” review. Id. at 489 (adopting the “less than strict” standard of
review for commercial speech). See generally Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618, 634-35 (1995) (upholding a state bar rule making lawyers wait thirty days before
soliciting legal business from accident victims or their families by direct mail); United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1993) (upholding against a First
Amendment challenge a federal statute prohibiting a radio station licensed in North
Carolina, a non-lottery state, from broadcasting advertisements to another state’s lottery);
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-56
(1986) (upholding a ban on the advertisement of casino gambling to residents of Puerto
Rico, reasoning that the power to regulate such commercial speech was a derivative of the
greater power to ban gambling); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (holding a
statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the
prices of prescription drugs as unconstitutional, based on First Amendment protection);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26 (1975) (holding it an error to assume that
commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment Protection or that it lacks value in the
marketplace of ideas). See also John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J.
1293, 1300 (1993) (noting how First Amendment law has evolved into an elaborate
construction of specific judicial decisions). Previously, fraudulent or misleading commercial
speech was altogether unprotected by the First Amendment, and therefore its regulation was
not subject to constitutional review. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes
and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 146 (1996).
4. See supra notes 1-2.
5. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers and
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shareholders, and their corporate involvement is focused, and often limited,
to the corporation's financial performance.6 Board members of the
corporation typically do not receive information about product disclosures
and are not considered to be in charge of the corporation's relationship with
its consumers. Indeed, a corporation’s board members, who are personally
accountable for financial reports under several regimes, often approve
disclosures to investors under the federal securities laws.7 However, direct
accountability neither applies to consumers nor accompanies product
disclosures.
Regulation favors investors over consumers. For investors, the SEC
provides information management services and has established uniform
legible standards for disclosure, which are accessible through a Web-based
platform for comparing alternative corporate investments.8 No such
regulatory service is available for consumer products. Investors' rights to
information are provided ex ante to the moment of purchase, whereas
consumers' rights to information are generally left to court rulings from
cases of misrepresentation, ex post to the transaction date.
What distinguishes consumers from investors? Mainly, the purpose of
the purchase: consumers shopping for higher returns on their investments
are legally protected and secured, whereas consumers shopping for other
products or services are left to bargain for information under their contracts
of purchase. Indeed, a buyer's status as an investor or as a consumer forms

directors . . .[,] [w]hile technically not trustees . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders.”); see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919) (noting that directors are employed and a corporation is organized primarily
for the profit of the stockholders).
6. The following information is typically provided to the directors of publicly held
companies: monthly, quarterly, and annual financial statements; cash flow, capital and
operating budgets; materials on business and financial aspects of major proposed actions
such as mergers, sales of securities, or investment in new plants; salary and pension
information, in general terms; information on major litigation by or against the corporation;
information on labor negotiations; copies of important documents filed with government
agencies, and important press releases; an agenda for the Board meeting, with minutes of the
past meeting; analyses of the company done by outside sources, and information about the
industry; perhaps, manufacturing or marketing data; and tax information. ). Session Four:
The Board of Directors’ Access to and Use of Information, 6 J. COMP. BUS. & CAPITAL
MARKET L. 243, 252 n.9 (1984) Directors of privately held companies would receive the
same sort of information, especially the information in categories (a)-(c). Id.
7. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) (requiring responsibility for corporate
actions in a variety of circumstances, including financial reports).
8. See Filings & Forms, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (providing that all companies,
foreign and domestic, are required to file registration statements, periodic reports, and other
forms electronically through EDGAR).
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a clear dichotomy of informational rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has
considered requests for product information based on buyers’ motivation,9
but has denied informational rights to consumers who were not categorized
as investors and who lacked investment motivation in their purchase.
Consumption motivation is our system's justification for denying product
information to consumers of real life essentials and for eliminating their
freedom of choice.10
9. A few cases demonstrate the significance corporate law attaches to investors rather
than consumers. In Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., the respondent
offered units of citrus grove development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing
and remitting net proceeds to the investor. 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946). Each customer was
offered both a land sales contract and a service contract, after being told that it was not
feasible to invest in the grove unless a service contract is made. Id. at 295. The land sale
contract provided a uniform contract price per acre or fraction thereof, varying in amount
only with the number of years the plot had been planted with citrus trees. Id. The service
contract gave possession over the land to an affiliated party of the seller, where the company
was accountable only for an allocation of the net profits based on a check made at the time
of picking. Id. at 296. The purchasers were, for the most part, non-residents of Florida,
predominantly business people who lacked the knowledge and equipment to cultivate citrus
groves. Id. The Securities Exchange Commission claimed that the transaction constituted
an “investment contract” subject to the Securities Act in order to base disclosure
requirements on the seller. Id. at 297-98. If the transaction was not labeled an investment
contract, no disclosure requirement was necessary. Id. Likewise, in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, a housing cooperative in New York City offered apartments
through shares of stock that were explicitly tied to the apartment. 421 U.S. 837, 842 (1975).
The respondents claimed the Information Bulletin that accompanied the transaction failed to
disclose several critical facts. Id. at 844. One test applied by the Court of Appeals was the
expectation for profits: to be considered for enhanced disclosure requirements, the purchase
should be motivated by the prospect of returns on investment rather than the use or
consumption of the item purchased. Id. at 851-53. The Supreme Court concluded that the
investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live and not by the
financial returns of their investment, and hence could not benefit from securities disclosure
requirements. Id. at 853. Finally, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court rejected
the Howey approach to determining whether an instrument is “an investment contract,” only
to adopt the “family resemblance” test of a security, applying the same motivation
examination, where courts are required “to assess the motivations that would prompt a
reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it.” 494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990). The Court stated:
If the seller’s purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business
enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested
primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is likely to
be a “security.” If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a
minor asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller’s cash-flow difficulties or
to advance some other commercial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the
note is less sensibly described as a “security.
Id. at 66. Howey, Forman, and Reves demonstrate an unbearable result from the perspective
of this Article. There is no sound justification for excluding consumers from disclosure
rights based on their consumption motivations. The court is working under the assumption
that only investors should be entitled to information accountability standards.
10. See W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 300 (explaining that securities laws apply when
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Legal literature widely views a corporation as a hierarchy of
shareholders, board members, and management, where each layer is
serving as an appointed agent of the former layer.11 Shareholders appoint
the members of the board, who in turn appoint a management team to
manage the shareholders’ assets held by the corporation.12 Most corporate
law scholarship discusses mechanisms to reduce the agency costs
accompanying this corporate structure, aiming to increase shareholder
value stemming from the corporation: the ultimate purpose of corporate
law.13 A large body of literature focuses on corporate disclosure duties
typically imposed in order to enhance shareholder participation and
empowerment in the otherwise agent-based management.14 Most of this
investors “are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their investment” and that the
laws do not apply when purchasers are motivated “to occupy the land or to develop it
themselves”); see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 64, aff’d, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170
(1993); Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled by Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (using an approach focusing on investment-like
properties, certain promissory notes were classified as securities); Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi.
v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that certain notes
can be classified as securities within the federal securities laws, relying in part on the
commercial-investment dichotomy used in classification).
11. Viewing the shareholder franchise as a key mechanism for keeping boards
accountable is an essential and well-established mechanism of corporate law, documented in
the literature as well as in court opinions. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (discussing the “central importance of the [shareholder] franchise
to the scheme of corporate governance”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected
representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board
out.”). For a leading analysis of the faults of this apparent corporate democracy, see Lucian
A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007). For a
leading discussion of management-board relationships as principal-agent, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915
(2010).
12. Shareholders who are displeased with their board can nominate director candidates
and then solicit proxies for them. See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 105 (1986) (outlining
statutory authority for shareholder removal of corporate directors); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev., 833, 837 (2005) (“In theory,
incumbents who fail to initiate a change that shareholders view as value-increasing will be
ousted in a proxy contest by a team promising to make the value-enhancing change.”).
13. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Making Directors Accountable, HARVARD MAG., Nov.-Dec.
2003, at 29.
14. See e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373-80 (1998) (providing a historic perspective
and rationale for the disclosure requirement); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in
International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387, 401-07 (2001) (stating that
disclosure duties provide protection for investors and discussing the need to establish clear
rules for international securities transactions); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2533-50 (1997)
(illustrating the benefits from greater disclosure, including fairness for the investors,
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literature focuses on the mandatory nature of disclosure duties towards
investors and their underlying justification.15
The call for including consumers as corporate stakeholders and for
imposing corporate informational accountability towards consumers rests
on the observation that investors are not the only group that may provide
value to corporate production and thus are not the only group to whom the
corporation owes value.16 Rather than viewing the corporation as property
of its shareholders, stakeholder theory views the corporation as a set of
relationships between customers, suppliers, employees, financiers
(stockholders, bondholders, banks, etc.), and communities.17 Under the
stakeholder approach, the role of the board of directors is to manage and
shape those relationships and allocate resources and liabilities among
different stakeholder groups.18 Blair and Stout suggest a “team production”
theory of corporate law, wherein corporations are legal entities forming a
platform for sharing rights in a joint product created based on the input of
all team members: financiers, investors, employees, suppliers, customers
and others.19 Accordingly, the board of directors becomes a “mediating
hierarchy,” and board members become coordinators of team members’

investment risk reduction, and efficient allocation of resources). Cf. Marcel Kahan,
Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 103435 (1992) (discussing macroeconomic impact of sudden market corrections after previously
undisclosed information goes public); Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in
Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81 (2007)
(advocating mandatory, rather than market-based disclosure requirements).
15. See generally JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 250 (2009) (citing James D. Cox,
Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1230-1232 (1999)
(discussing alternative viewpoints on which regulatory bodies are best equipped to set and
enforce mandatory disclosure requirements)).
16. See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE
ART 5-6 (2010) (suggesting relationships between a business and groups affecting or
affected by it as unit of analysis); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 38
(2012) (stating that stakeholders contract with, rather than own, corporations and
“corporations own themselves”); Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder
Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
65, 68 (1999) (“Stakeholder analysts argue that all persons or groups with legitimate
interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima
facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another.”) (emphasis in original); R.
EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984)
(defining stakeholder as one who can “affect or is affected by” an organization).
17. See STOUT, supra note 16, at 37-38 (stating that shareholders—like debtholders,
employees, and suppliers—contracts with corporations).
18. FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 16.
19. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250-51 (1999).
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activities and allocators of the resulting production value between different
members.20
Recent trends in corporate disclosures reflect an increase in
corporations' willingness to consider a wider circle of stakeholders.
Sustainability reporting, which gives investors information about the nonfinancial performance of the corporation in different constituencies, is now
widely applied and incorporated into corporate filings,21 and some nations
require inclusion of its principles.22 All but one company listed in the S&P
500 has voluntarily made a sustainability disclosure in a financial filing or
linked financial performance to a sustainability initiative.23 As of 2013,
U.K. regulations require that publicly traded, large corporations file
“strategic reports,” which must include corporate performance indicators,
which effectively measure the company's business position and its
performance.24 In India, a 2013 law requires large companies to invest in
sustainability initiatives and engage in corporate social responsibility
activities with two percent of their average net profits.25
This article argues for the inclusion of consumers as corporate
stakeholders and for corporate accountability for product information. The
argument is structured as follows. Part I compares consumers to investors,
showing that consumers are more vulnerable in their relationships with
corporate sellers than investors are and thus need greater informational
accountability. This article compares the scope of risks per purchase (or
investment), the complexity of product choice versus investment allocation,
and the right to exit, showing that consumers are at least as vulnerable as
investors. The consumer products market is compared to capital markets,
and in particular, the role of institutional and investment advisors acting in
20. Id. at 250.
21. PETER DESIMONE, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST., INTEGRATED
FINANCIAL AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1-4 (2013), available at
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_Financial_Sustain_Reporting_April_2013.pdf;
STEVE LYDENBERG, JEAN ROGERS & DAVID WOOD, THE HAUSER CENTER FOR NONPROFIT
ORG., FROM TRANSPARENCY TO PERFORMANCE: INDUSTRY-BASED SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING ON KEY ISSUES 2 (2010), available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/wpcontent/uploads/2010/05/IRI_Combined_KPI.pdf.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 282-286
23. DESIMONE, supra note 21, at 5.
24. The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations
2013, 2013, S.I. 1970 (U.K.). These reports on the company’s corporate standing include
“information about (i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s
business on the environment) (ii) the company’s employees, and (iii) social community and
human rights issues . . . .” Id. at § 414C(7)(b)(i)-(iii)..
25. Section 135 of the new Act requires that the Board of Directors makes sure that at
least two percent of the company’s average net profits during the three preceding years is
spent on corporate social responsibility policy. For the full version of the law, see The
Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013).
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the investment market is compared to consumer unions acting with the aim
of reducing information gathering costs in the consumer products market.
Comparing the structural characteristics of the consumer products market
to the capital markets leads to the same conclusion: consumers'
informational rights are under protected.
Part II analyzes the voluntary commercial speech environments for the
consumer products market. The analysis portrays informational practices
from three distinct sources: sellers, consumers, and third parties—in
particular, consumer organizations. This second part of the article explains
why voluntary disclosures are insufficient to create a solid foundation for
freedom of consumer choice, due to both market failures in consumers'
demand for information and to market failures in the supply of product
information. Consumers have both too much and too little information:
commercial speech overwhelms informational environments, but, given
masses of information overload, it often becomes very costly to find factual
information about the material features of the product. At the same time,
often the most important and material information is completely
unavailable due to insufficient incentives for all three information sources,
the inaccessibility of adequate sources of information, and suboptimal
mediums for its dissemination. Consider, the following examples: the
effective costs of car ownership, the chemical composition and quality of
bottled water, and the real savings value compared to future costs of living
for pension plans. Consumers' bounded rationality, along with their
cognitive limitations, makes them vulnerable to the overloaded commercial
speech environment, and given limitations in consumers' capacity to absorb
and analyze the overload of information in the consumer products market,
leads to failure in the efficient allocation of demand for product
information. Sustainability reporting gives little answer to the problem of
product information as it is not product specific and not directed at
consumers. Market failure is evident on both the demand and supply side
of the product information market.
Part III argues for consumers' corporate membership using
organizational theories of the corporation. Given that consumer contracts
are frequently non-negotiable,26 but rather subject consumers to the rules
determined unilaterally by the seller, the relationship of consumers with

26. Contract obligations are voluntarily assumed: a contract is a legal vehicle for
enforcement of mutual assent. In the sale of products or services to the public, one side
defines the terms and elements of agreement, and the consumer may merely opt-in or out of
the agreement by her decision of purchase. See JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT
HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 511, 420-21 (8th
ed. 2003) (discussing the prevalence of standard form contracts in modern business and
observing that parties do not negotiate the details of every transaction).
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corporate sellers resembles organizational membership.
Securities
27
Exchange Commission v. H. J. Howey Co. and United Housing
Foundation Inc. v. Forman28 create a legal distortion because it is not the
purpose of purchase we need to protect, but rather the unilateral
relationship and one-sided control of all relevant information, which
equally apply to consumers and investors alike.
Part IV compares the doctrinal foundations of corporate law to those
currently available to consumers under contract law, showing the merits of
the former in setting a disclosure regime for the consumer sector. While
theoretical foundations for corporate inclusion of stakeholders are well
established, corporate law literature does not offer any model for corporate
accountability towards consumers. Part IV suggests three essentials for
product information corporate policy. Product information should be
required to include all material features and aspects of product ownership
and be accessible and concise from a reasonable consumer's point of view.
Disclosures should be accessible, easy to understand and read, and be
placed prominently on the front of the package. The article suggests
standards for product transparency requirements and establishes corporate
law as the doctrinal setting for product disclosures, offering an extension of
the scope of current corporate governance.
I.

COMPARING CONSUMERS TO INVESTORS

Free choice serves as a basic and prominent foundation of capitalistic
social ideology and of the respective legal thought regarding the
commercial arena. Choice encompasses the moral basis for contracts and
their enforcement and is widely considered both a value to be strived for
and a basis for responsibility allocation of the agents possessing it. Our
legal system goes a long way to protect that meaningful choice process for
investors, creating a federal agency that sets exclusive disclosure standards
for securities,29 whereas consumers seem to conduct many of their choices
in informational darkness, significantly limiting their ability to exercise
informed and rational decision-making.30 In this part of the article,
consumers are compared to investors using several analytic measures. An
27. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
28. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
29. See supra text accompanying note 1.
30. Informational darkness may be caused by insufficient product information or by an
overloaded information environment placing the costs of research on the consumer. In
general, freedom of commercial speech applies to all speech regarding products, with the
exception of food and drugs. See Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free
Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 140-43 (2011) (discussing
FDA regulations on speech).
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analysis of the characteristics of the two groups and their applicable
markets shows that consumers should be protected at least as much as
investors and may in fact require a higher degree of protection than that
given to investors regarding informational rights.
A. Consumer Choice Process vs. Investments Allocation Process
Consumers' product choice process is prone to mistakes and
confusion. While an investor’s typical investment allocation is done in a
rational, planned process that uses advisors or mediating institutions,
typical consumer choice is spontaneous, irrational and highly affected by
personal emotions and cognitive limitations. Corporate sellers strategically
avoid information-based marketing and instead strengthen the emotional
aspect of consumer decision making because they lack incentives to share
product information with the public.31 Bundling strategies promote the
consumers’ misperception of products and services, subjecting rational
information-based decision making to potential misperceptions.32 Vague
and manipulative presentations place a significant burden on consumers
trying to compare and understand the implications of products.33 Even if
31. For a sociological analysis of subjective emotional promotions in consumer
markets, see JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 88-89
(C.T. trans., Sage Publications 1998) (1970); MARTY NEUMEIER, THE BRAND GAP: HOW TO
BRIDGE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN BUSINESS STRATEGY AND DESIGN 38-39 (2003). Sellers do
have an incentive to treat their clients fairly because repeat buyers consider the reputation of
a seller as shown in Lucian A. Bebchuck & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2006). However, in a
competitive context, information sharing and investment in assistance to consumers in
evaluating products’ characteristics may prove inefficient and costly for sellers. See, e.g.,
Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 44 J.L. & ECON 491, 503 (1981) (discussing the costs of consumer protection
regulation). Consumers’ ignorance benefits sellers on average also due to the sub-optimal
use of products by ignorant consumers.
32. See Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33,
33-34 (2006) (taking consumer misperception as a given and discussing how sellers employ
the bundling strategy in the face of that misperception); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting
and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199, 208-09 (1985) (discussing bundling in the
context of segregate gains); Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets:
The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661 (1982) (examining bundling through
the lens of tying requirements).
33. This is due to both cognitive and emotional constraints. For a general survey of
cognitive constraints, see Angelo DeNisi & Raed Elaydi, Which Came First, The Irrational
Consumer or the Irrational Corporation?, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 33, 35 (2000)
(discussing information constraints placed on consumers by organizations); Christine Jolls,
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-77 (1998) (discussing three limitations of human behavior:
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest, that cause humans to
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sellers provided complete information regarding product characteristics,
consumers would be unable to analyze and process the mass of information
available to them due to information overload34 and low literacy levels with
respect to corporate documents.35
B. Scope of Risks
Typically, investors risk only the capital located in their investment
funds. Exceptions occur in structured products, derivatives, and shorts,
which often risk additional funds due to higher leverage. In all cases,
investors’ risk is solely monetary. Consumers, on the other hand, risk
much more than the purchase cost. Often, consumer products have health
implications. In foods, beverages, toys, clothing, automobiles, cellular
devices, and many other products, consumers trust sellers with their health
and potentially their lives. Potential risks from products can therefore be
much greater than the purchase cost.36 A higher degree of regulation
applies to product safety and quality control.37 However, quality control
only kicks unacceptable products out of the market, without helping
consumers choose between remaining acceptable products.38
Corporate law does not govern product safety, thus the board of
directors is rarely liable for it. Product safety is an engineering staff issue
and has less to do with senior managers of the corporation, who are

diverge from economic models); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, SCIENCE, Sept. 1974, at 1124 (discussing systematic
error in commonly-used heuristics, including representativeness, availability of instances or
scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor) [hereinafter Tverksy & Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty]. For a general survey of emotional constraints, see Mary Frances Luce
et al., Emotional Decisions: Tradeoff Difficulty and Coping in Consumer Choice,
MONOGRAPHS OF THE J. OF CONSUMER RES., no. 1, 2001 (discussing the role of emotion in
decision processes).
34. See Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 167-77 (2007) (discussing the harmful effects of information
overload on contracting).
35. See generally Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract,
13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 234-35 (2002) (reviewing research on consumer literacy and
readability of consumer contracts and credit agreements).
36. Consider, for example, baby formula and automobile purchases, in which
consumers trust sellers with their lives.
37. This is not always the case. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (observing that although most products sold in the
United States pass safety regulations, credit products are relatively less regulated).
38. For example, consider the case of infant car seats. Quality control enforces a
minimal safety threshold. Consumers still need to make product choice between the
available products, differing in quality and features, beyond the minimal threshold.
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typically liable for risks imposed only on investors.39
C. Product Attributes and Complexity of Choice
Investments are typically judged by comparing expected rate of return
with imposed risk, so prices can reflect the demand and supply curve and
signal true value to investors. Products are more complex, and consumers
choose products based on a wider spectrum of considerations, features and
characteristics. Marketing research shows that, for consumer products,
“price is but one of several potentially useful extrinsic cues; brand name or
package may be equally or more important, especially in packaged goods.
Further, evidence of a generalized price-perceived quality relationship is
inconclusive.”40 Thus, while prices can serve as an ultimate signal of value
in the investments market, they are less likely to reflect accurately the value
to consumers.41
D. Intermediaries
Institutional investors and investment advisors are frequent players in
the capital markets that have expertise and analytical tools for evaluating
different investment strategies based on corporate filings.42 While
investment advisers serve the general investing public with investment
advice,43 institutional investors perform most of the transactions in the
capital markets.44 The Securities Act of 193345 and the Securities Exchange
39. See generally Francois Brochet and Suraj Srinivasan, Accountability of
Independent Directors - Evidence From Firms Subject to Securities Litigation (Working
Paper,
2013),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285776
or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2285776 (discussing the liability of directors when firms are
sued for financial and disclosure related fraud).
40. Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A
Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence, 52 J. MARKETING 2, 17 (1988).
41. See generally Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (explaining that economic models fail to predict consumer
behavior because economic models treat consumers as experts even though the average
consumer is not an expert decision-maker).
42. See Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the
Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 18-20 (2011) (discussing the role of investment
advisers). See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S.
Capital Markets, 3 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 245 (2009) (discussing the investment
practices of major institutional investors in the U.S. capital markets).
43. Krug, supra note 42, at 18.
44. See Palmiter, supra note 42, at 245 (noting that institutional investors “collectively
hold more than three-fourths of U.S. capital market investments.”).
45. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982) regulates the public offering
and sale of securities in interstate commerce, requiring a prospectus designed to provide all
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Act of 193446 were enacted during the peak years of the Great Depression
with an aim towards protect individual investors. Nowadays, institutions
dominate the trading platforms and make most of the U.S. trading
volume.47
In the consumer product market, consumer unions48 take on this role.
Like analysts and investment advisors, consumer unions exploit economies
of scale when evaluating and comparing product information. Unlike
individual consumers, consumer unions can devote the resources to
conduct a thorough study of the products available by collecting the
information, analyzing it, and finally comparing it on a measurable scale.49
The relationship between consumers and their union may be classified as
an agency relationship; the union is authorized to collect product
information and test it on behalf of its subscribers. One prominent example
is Consumer Reports, which is published by Consumers Union, a nonprofit
organization established in the 1930s when advertising started flooding the
media.50 For a small fee, consumers in the United States can subscribe to a
material information necessary to investors to fully assess the merits and risks of the
purchased security.
46. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982) requires all
registrants to file periodic reports in electronic format through EDGAR, the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System.
47. Palmiter, supra note 42, at 245. In the 1950s, retail investors owned over ninety
percent of the stock of U.S. corporations. Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail
Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009). By 2009, retail investors owned less than
thirty percent and represented a very small percentage in U.S. trading volume. Id.; see also
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) (observing the rapid shift in the last
thirty years toward the institutionalization in the financial markets in the United States).
48. In using the term “consumers union” in this article, I mean to refer to any platform
that consumers may look to in order to receive information about products and services.
Some consumer unions may require subscriptions, such as Consumer Reports. Subscribe,
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG,
https://ec.consumerreports.org/ec/cro/order.htm?INTKEY=
I0AHLT4 (last visited, Dec. 23, 2014). Other consumer unions may be free of charge, such
as Yelp. YELP, http://www.yelp.com/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
49.
See CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, supra note 48 (noting that subscribers get “over a
thousand ratings, reviews, expert buying advice, product comparisons, consumer user
reviews, and product video clips to over 5,000 electronics, appliances, home & garden, baby
gear, and food products . . .”).
50. Occasionally consumers have additional impartial sources of information provided
by third parties giving independent commercial speech. See, e.g., Energy Bill Savings Start
Here!, USWITCH, http://www.uswitch.com/gas-electricity/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014)
(providing for a comparison of gas, electricity, broadband television, mobile phones, and
insurance); Choose the Right Cell Phone or Plan for You, MYRATEPLAN,
http://www.myrateplan.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (providing a comparison of a wide
array of consumer needs, including cell-phone plans, television services, credit cards, travel
options, and insurance). Interestingly, these free services stay impartial while being
frequently sponsored by the reviewed industry. USwitch UK complies with The Confidence
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website or magazine that summarizes product information impartially and
professionally, and presents its findings in a comparable way.51 To create
its professional product studies, Consumers Union employs more than 600
employees,52 who make anonymous purchases, test products in equipped
laboratories, and publish educational studies for its subscribers.53
Consumers Union aims to provide an impartial, independent source of
product information that accepts no advertising and runs professional tests
on products on behalf of potential consumers.54 The information output
from Consumer Reports is impartial, runs ad-free, and is organized and
presented systematically.55 Consumers Union tests products, grades their
performance under several chosen criteria, compares them to other
products in the same category, and presents the results in a table format that
allows for easy comparison and consumer choice. In a typical report,
Consumer Reports lists the prices of several alternatives and for each gives
the overall score and specific grade in each of the tested criteria.
However, this detailed, analytical report of the alternatives is only
available for a narrow selection of brands and products.56 The impartial
product review published in Consumer Reports refers to a limited number
of categories and compares only a few of the available brands for each
product surveyed. Other intermediaries acting in the consumer products
market may be sponsored by the industry reviewed, impairing the

Code, a voluntary practice that requires unbiased comparisons through independence,
impartiality, the fair presentation of tariffs, and the accuracy of information presented,
which is managed by the UK energy market regulator Ofgem. Confidence Code – Code of
Practice for Online Domestic Price Comparison Services, OFGEM (Mar. 18, 2013),
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/74615/confidence-code.pdf.
51. Some services, like USwitch U.K., are free of charge, while others, like Consumer
Reports, charge membership fees. Compare Energy Bill Savings Start Here!, supra note 50
(providing
product
comparisons
for
free)
with
Choose
Subscription,
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG,
https://ec.consumerreports.org/ec/cro/order.htm?INTKEY=
I0AHLT4 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (providing comparison services only if the user
becomes a paid subscriber).
52. Employment is funded by revenue generated by subscriptions. See Mission,
CONSUMERSUNION, http://www.consumersunion.org/about/mission/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2014) (providing information about the Consumers Union staff).
53. Mission, CONSUMERSUNION.ORG, http://consumersunion.org/about/mission/ (last
visited, Dec. 9, 2014)
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Most of the products Consumer Union surveys in Consumer Reports are for rather
large purchases, such as kitchen appliances, automobiles, and expensive baby equipment.
Consumers Union does not survey any services or low-cost products, perhaps under the
assumption that services require customization and are thus hard to compare on an ultimate
social scale, and low-cost items do not stem the drive to research or pay the fee for a
collective research source.
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impartiality and commitment to the consumer as their ultimate client.57
Therefore, consumers unions acting in the consumer product
information market are not a sufficient solution to the problems of product
information. Unlike analysts and investment advisors acting in capital
markets and serving investors, intermediaries acting on behalf of
consumers fail to solve market failures in the consumer products market
due to both the costs of information and the structural differences between
the consumer products and the investment markets.
The discrepancy of information costs between capital and consumer
products markets is significant. Due to the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws, intermediaries acting in capital markets have
abundant information available under the uniform requirements of
securities regulation and need only to review and analyze well-digested and
easily accessible information,58 while third parties must bear the costs of
searching, verifying, analyzing, and occasionally pricing product
information.59
The cost of obtaining information is significant for the efficient
functioning of institutions. Institutions acting in capital markets find
mandatory disclosure under securities laws useful and think disclosure
provides users “essential information that heavily influences their
decisions.”60 The information management mechanisms provided by
EDGAR and its plain English form are generally satisfactory to institutions
and assist in reducing transaction costs and in facilitating the dissemination
of clear information to the market.61 Institutions are attracted to firms with
certain disclosure practices, and some corporate managers adopt disclosure
practices to attract such investors.62 A recent empirical study shows that
57. See, e.g., WhistleOut Terms of Use, WHISTLEOUT.COM http://www.whistleout.
com.au/Terms-Of-Use (last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (providing consumer comparisons of
complex products sponsored through referral commissions of the industries reviewed);
YELP.COM, http://www.yelp.com/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (relying on enhanced search
results offered to merchants for sponsorship).
58. See supra note 1 (identifying the primary statutes that regulate the issuance of
securities in the United States).
59. See How We Test, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/
about-us/whats-behind-the-ratings/testing/index.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014)
(documenting the considerable technical, engineering, and scientific costs of Consumer
Reports).
60. Evans, supra note 47, at 1108 (citing THE SPECIAL COMM. ON FIN. REPORTING, AM.
INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT., IMPROVING BUSINESS REPORTING – A CUSTOMER FOCUS:
MEETING THE INFORMATIONAL NEEDS OF INVESTORS & CREDITORS (1994), available at
http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/frc/accountingfinancialreporting/downloadabledocument
s/jenkins%20committee%20report.pdf).
61. Id. at 1112.
62. See Brian J. Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Corporate Disclosure Practices,
Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 171, 200 (2000)
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even index funds, which are passive and cost-conscious investors, govern
through eliciting disclosure.63 Indeed, institutional investors appreciate
disclosures: they have the capacity to analyze and understand the disclosed
texts and the ability to elicit information.64 A recent work comparing the
bond and the loan markets in the U.S. shows that even in the absence of
mandatory disclosure, institutional investors obtain significant information
about their investments in syndicated loans through private ordering.65
In contrast, for the consumer products market, accumulated
information of past consumers' experiences is rare. Consider food and
beverages as an example – the shared experiences of consumers fail to
inform us of the ingredients in, and nutritional value of, what we consume.
However, intermediaries will only bear the costs of research if such
research efforts would result in profit. Because sellers are the lower cost
provider, there is no sense in expecting intermediaries to conduct research
that would reverse engineer food in order to decipher ingredients and
nutritional value. For complex products that often require extensive
research in order to reveal their nature and characteristics, these costs may
be significant. Information aggregators and intermediaries are bound to
engage in duplicate efforts to reach the same information and uncover it
only partially. Mandatory disclosure may lower the cost of information,
and may thus be justified as a means to improve and enhance the
competition between information aggregators and intermediaries, as well as
a means to reduce the entry barriers to the market of information
aggregation for the benefit of consumers.66
The discrepancy of costs for information traders for investors and for
consumers is especially questionable when considering the information
gaps between seller corporations and outside information traders seeking to
uncover nonpublic information. This is especially true regarding complex
products that often require extensive research in order to reveal their nature
and characteristics. While regulation lowers the costs of information
searching for investors, no such information regulation is available for

(“[I]nstitutional investors are attracted to firms with more forthcoming disclosure.”); Mark
H. Lang and Russell J. Lundholm, Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior, 71
ACCT. REV. 467, 490 (1996) (“[M]ore forthcoming disclosure policies . . . attract more
analysts . . . .”).
63. Jordan Schoenfeld, Shareholder Governance Through Disclosure (May 4, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350181.
64. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged
Loan Market, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014)
65. Id.
66. See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713-14 (2006) (positing that the role of securities
regulation is to create and promote a competitive market for information traders).
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consumers, and third parties acting in the consumer product information
market are bound to engage in duplicate efforts to reach the same
information and only partially uncover it. As the cost of information
decreases, the number of third party agents and information traders is
expected to increase,67 and their contribution is expected to be more
precise.68
Corporate accountability for product disclosures can be justified as a
means to improve and enhance the competition between information
traders and third party information providers, and as a means to reduce the
entry barriers to the market of information trading in the consumer products
market. The seller corporation is the low-cost provider of relevant
information.
More corporate accountability for consumer product
disclosures may lead to fewer instances of asymmetric information between
consumers and sellers, and contribute to facilitating a competitive market.69
In addition to cost, another reason for the discrepancy between
institutions in capital markets and intermediaries in the consumer products
market is the structural characteristics of both markets. Institutions in
capital markets enjoy the benefit of a social policy enforcing the public use
of their services. Pension funds and provident funds, for example, present
an extraordinary benefit to their clients, who are inclined to use their
professional services in order to receive the tax benefits and social
assurance that accompanies pension savings.70 Mutual funds and index
funds allow the public saving routes that reduce transaction costs for
trading.71 Financial regulation, however, restricts the occupation of money
management to few certified and highly regulated institutions.72 Because
of this, capital markets are prone to have classes of investors represented by

67. See id. at 737 (observing that decreased information search, verification, and
analysis costs results in an increase in information traders).
68. This argument assumes that mandatory disclosure lowers the effect of noise traders
and associated noise risk. Id. at 739 (citing Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should
Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 424 (1996)).
69. Id. at 740.
70. See Sharon Reece & Mary Beth Navin, Regulating Pension Fund Investments: The
Role of Federal Legislation, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 101, 105 (1992) (noting that the tax
benefits associated with using pension funds include “exempting pension fund earnings
from federal income tax, allowing employed contributions to accrue tax-deferred to the
employee and permitting certain kinds of favorable distribution treatment.”).
71. See e.g., Mutual Funds, OHIO DEFERRED COMPENSATION, available at
https://www.ohio457.org/iApp/tcm/ohio457/guide/basics/mutualfunds/index.jsp (last visited
Dec. 23, 2014) (noting that mutual funds lower transaction costs “[b]ecause of the size and
volume of their transactions”).
72. See Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940:
Regulation By Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 627 (2008) (identifying the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 as “[t]he centerpiece of U.S. regulation of money managers.”).
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few certified money managers.
Consumers, on the other hand, make their decisions unaided. We
rarely shop individually for securities, but we always go grocery shopping
without an intermediary by our side. So the case for informed consent,
empowerment, and the need of access to knowledge is stronger for
consumers than for retail investors. And at the same time, while the market
for intermediaries in capital markets prosper thanks to tax incentives and
financial regulation, incentives for creating a market of intermediaries in
the consumer products market are meager. Providing a database of
mandatory information lowers the costs of entry to the information
aggregation market and may be required to support its growth.73
E. The Right to Exit
Corporations give their members and owners three types of rights:
exit, voice, and loyalty.74 Of relevance to this article is the right to exit.
Indeed, investors in public corporations may exit their investments at
reasonable costs, by selling their securities on an exchange or over the
counter and “cashing out” of their relationship with the corporation.
Consumers of mass products and services may find higher barriers to
switching their consumption preferences. Costs of exiting may include
fees, contractual restrictions, and social and logistical costs that make the
right to exit theoretical or very costly for the average consumer.75 Consider
the costs of switching a childcare service provider at a preschool, the costs
of switching a bank account service center, and the costs of switching
media and cellular providers. In all three examples, exit is very costly and
unlikely to serve as a tool of disciplining bad management in striving for its
reform, even given high and effective competition in the markets. The
costs of exit sometimes arise naturally from the situation, as in the
73. EDGAR is an interesting benchmark for mandatory disclosure for consumers
because it succeeds in addressing both the needs of retail investors and the requirements of
institutions. Securities disclosures are provided on a single database accessible to all at all
times, rather than enclosed to each particular securities transaction. EDGAR provides the
interested public information easy to compare and to trace back, without burdening or
imposing on the non-interested public. Company Filings, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2014).
74. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 76-77 (1970) (examining a manner of
analyzing certain economic processes which can illuminate a wide range of social, political,
and moral phenomena).
75. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
151, 151 (2014) (discussing restrictions on exit rights and noting that “consumers often
choose transactions with lock-in provisions, trading off exit rights for other perks.”).
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childcare example, but are often pre-designed carefully by corporate sellers
as a strategic method of preventing profit loss.76 For example, the costs of
switching banking providers could be lowered if consumers were entitled
to switch and keep their bank account numbers, payment orders, and
records. However, the industry prefers keeping the costs high to preserve
its profitability margins.77
F. Regulation
Investors’ informational interests are strictly protected by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a mighty regulatory agency
with wide authority to determine the content, form, and timing of
disclosure.78 The elaborate framework of disclosure rules developed by the
SEC includes a web-based platform that is easily accessible to all with
plain English uniform disclosures.79
Consumers’ informational interests lie on contractual foundations.
Thus, product information is scattered throughout separate sources of
various credibility and impact, and is presented in widely different forms
and languages. Consumers interested in a product must bear the costs of
assembling this information. Corporations, which already have and can
easily provide the information, typically choose to engage in commercial
speech that creates emotional manipulation and vague branding on the one
hand and information overload on the other.80 No single authority is in
position to demand material information for products for the benefit of their
users, and consumers are limited to claims of contractual misrepresentation,
fraud, and to a lengthy and costly process of legal proceedings to seek
remedies while overcoming the burden of the de minimis rule. Since
consumers are widely dispersed, pursuing such proceedings is highly
unlikely.
Regulation’s preference toward investors is beyond ownership status.
Shareholders are owners of the corporation, and disclosure to them is easily
justifiable as part of their ownership and property rights in the incorporated
asset. Creditors, however, receive similar information management
services to those granted to shareholders,81 despite having a contractual
76. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar supra note 75, at 152 (noting that exit hurts sellers and
that some sellers worked to make exit costly through contractual provisions).
77. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar supra note 75, at 152 (noting that exit hurts sellers and
that some sellers work to make exit costly through contractual provisions).
78. See supra note 1 (discussing the securities regulation framework established by the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
79. See supra note 73 (discussing the SEC’s EDGAR platform).
80. See discussion infra Part II section B.1.
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) (defining a security as “any note,” with several
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relationship with corporations that is similar to that of consumers. The
informational protection of creditors thus shows that the law protects
investors as a preferred status. An analysis of the choice process of
consumers as compared to the investment allocation process shows that
consumers are at least as vulnerable as investors. Comparing the consumer
product market to capital markets shows that market forces, regulation, and
intermediaries are better protecting investors, and that consumers typically
make their product research and choice unaided. In the following part, this
article provides an analysis of voluntary disclosures available in the
consumer product market to evaluate the degree of informational protection
provided to consumers by freedom of commercial speech.
II.

WHY IS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE NOT ENOUGH?

We are surrounded by vast amounts of product and brand information.
This part of the article provides a thorough analysis of product information
markets, arguing that what consumers know is not enough and is at the
same time too little and too much to affect consumers’ choice processes
efficiently. The analysis refers to sellers’ supply of product information on
the one hand, and to consumers’ demand for product information on the
other. Recent trends of sustainability disclosures are also discussed,
showing that they are not a better consumer choice process because of the
limited scope, audience, and enforcement incentives.
A. Supply of Product Information
The two main generic groups that supply product information are: (1)
sellers and (2) past and present consumers. The social allocation of product
information is currently pursued mainly through freedom of speech.82
Under this model, market forces determine the allocation of information
between sellers and consumers – namely what sellers and consumers
choose to share with each other voluntarily. Due to incentive disparities
between the two groups, sellers typically choose to share more information
than consumers; sellers stand to gain from information sharing, which can
increase their sales, enhance their reputation, and entrench their market
share, while consumers’ gain from such information sharing is usually
limited to their individual consumption capacity. Commercial speech is
exceptions); 15 U.S.C. § 78c (describing a security as “any note,” and proceeding to some
exclusions). Any note with a maturity exceeding nine months comes within the statutory
definition of a security. Id. § 78c (10).
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech . . . .”).
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thus mainly speech for commercial purposes: specifically, the purpose of
affecting sales.83 Below I argue that the marketplace rule of dissemination
of product information through commercial speech is resulting in market
failure and thus justifies intervention.
1. Consumers’ Commercial Speech
Consumers’ accumulated experiences are a vast source of product
information. Past consumers know almost everything there is to know
about a product, including its hidden highlights and most disturbing
problems. Had the market for product information been efficient, this vast
amount of accumulated information would change hands and be easily
forwarded to future consumers, who have yet to make their consumer
choice. Alas, a market failure on the supply side of information creates a
hurdle for this efficient transaction. Past and present consumers fail to
efficiently forward their accumulated experiences to future consumers due
to limited incentives, limited accessibility to communication mediums,
limited accessibility to the information, and reliability barriers.
a. Limited Incentives for Information Sharing
The product information environment is structured asymmetrically in
a way that allows sellers to dominate most content and forms of
commercial speech.84 This asymmetry is intrinsic to the structure of
merchandise business in a mass production society: within each market
segment, few sellers offer products to many consumers and consumers are
dispersed, typically acting separately and independently as individuals or
nuclear families.
Although sellers have strong incentives to use
commercial speech as a means of sales promotion, consumers are much
less inclined to use commercial speech simply because their stakes
involved with any given product are typically low and bounded by the
individual consumption scale. This problem can be conceptualized as a

83. Scanlon defines commercial speech with reference to the participant’s intent,
stating, “expression by a participant in the market for the purpose of attracting buyers or
sellers.” Thomas M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 519, 540-41 (1979). I focus on speech for marketing purposes, meant to attract
consumers, and more specifically, to persuade and otherwise affect them toward consuming
products or services promoting the speaker’s interest.
84.
Hsiu-Yuan Tsao, Pierre Berthon, Leyland Pitt & Michael Parent, Brand Signal
Quality of Products in an Asymmetric Online Information Environment: An Experimental
Study, 10 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 169, 169 (2011) (discussing seller strategies for exploiting
the information asymmetry in the consumer products market).
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problem of high transaction costs for information sharing,85 as well as a
problem of collective action for the consumer community. 86 Since
individual consumers are numerous, each having a small stake of
investment in any given product purchased, the consumer’s costs of
commercial speech per given product individually outweigh the expected
benefits, even when the accumulated interests of consumers as a group are
indicating an opposite result. It is individually rational for a consumer to
undertake the costs of commercial speech only when her proportionate
share of the expected collective consumers’ benefits from doing so exceeds
the expected costs.
b. Limited Accessibility to Communication Mediums
These problems were extremely difficult to overcome in the traditional
communication environment.
Traditionally, a scarce supply of
opportunities in mass communication mediums such as newspapers, radio
and television contribute to high costs of commercial speech.87
85. This is a conventional framing for this problem. Ronald Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase uses the case of environmental pollution to
show the economic principle of transaction costs, and to suggest that the harmful costs of
pollution should not be seen as externalities. Id. Rather, such costs result both from the
production process and from people’s choice to live near the plant. Rather than resulting
from externalities of the factory, pollution is seen as stemming from a large number of acts
and omissions on both sides. If the parties were able to bargain with one another – the
solution that they jointly prefer – an efficient result can be expected. In theory, steel users
(the factory’s consumers) and pollution sufferers might agree to share the cost of pollution
(for example, through the installation of antipollution equipment). “Transaction costs” are
the costs of coming together to reach an agreement, and these costs prevent bargains from
occurring. Bargaining is impracticable because of transaction costs, and regulation may be
used to overcome the problem of transaction costs and achieve an efficient arrangement.
86. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1st ed. 1982) (postulating
that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions); TODD SANDLER,
COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992) (synthesizing the latest research on
collective action). The resulting disincentive to act is compounded by the free-rider
problem: any one consumer may decide to save the costs of information sharing on the
belief that others will do so and she will still be able to enjoy the benefits in her next
purchases.
87. KYLE BAGWELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING 69-83 (Columbia Univ.
Dep’t of Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 0506-01, 2005), available at
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:115358. Interestingly, total advertising
expenditures have risen in recent years. While 20th century communication mediums were
scarce and voiced only corporate commercial speech, new media makes it possible for
consumers to voice their opinions in various channels of publicity, including web forums,
Facebook, Whatsapp and other social media channels accessible to all. See Mercedes
Esteban Bravo, José M. Vidal-Sanz & Gökhan Yildirim, Expenditure Trends in US
Advertising: Long-Term Effects and Structural Changes with New Media Introductions,
(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper No. 15, June 2012), available at
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Accordingly, consumers’ inclination to use commercial speech was lower,
simply because their accessibility to the communication mediums was
scarce and severely limited.88 Much of what we hear is thus what sellers
have spoken directly through promotional business sites and through online
advertisements, or indirectly, through other agents and astroturfing.89
Sellers thus quantitatively dominate the commercial speech arena.
In this asymmetric setting, the Internet created a distinctive revolution
by contributing to the democratization of information. On the Internet,
unlike in any traditional information medium, all users are free to become
creators and suppliers of information, and not merely its end consumers.
Thanks to the Internet, becoming a supplier of information, rather than
merely its consumer, is cheap, easy, and accessible to all.90
The Internet thus helped to democratize the product information
market due to the strict equality of its users who are equal not only in
access to information, and the equality in the opportunities of its creation
and dissemination.91 Since commercial speech opportunities are distributed
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/wbrepe/wb121506.html (a historical analysis of advertisement
expenditures in the U.S.).
88. Howard Rheingold, Participatory Media Literacy (2008, retrieved November
2014), available at https://www.socialtext.net/medialiteracy/index.cgi/
89. “Astroturfing” is “the deceptive practice of presenting an orchestrated marketing or
public relations campaign in the guise of unsolicited comments from members of the
public.”
See
Astroturfing
Definition,
OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/astroturfing (last visited Oct. 27,
2014). European Legislation is an example of the regulation of marketplace rule
information mechanism in the case of Internet astroturfing. See Eur. Parl. & Council
Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC) (stating that falsely claiming or creating the
impression that the trader is not acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or
profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer is a criminal offence).
90. Unlike the traditional communication mediums, which served mainly to promote
commercial speech opportunities of sellers as speakers, the Internet sets a social network for
consumer empowerment: it is the first communication medium that gives consumers the
opportunity to voice their opinions and review products and sellers. A vast pool of opinions
of prior consumers, often rated and aggregated, is available on the Internet. Consumer
rating is expanding through the Internet for a variety of services. Many shopping sites
include information about the rating previous consumers have given the offered product.
For example, Amazon.com presents consumers with the average rating previous readers
have given a certain book, including their comments and criticism.
Similarly,
Tripadvisor.com offers its consumers average ratings and detailed reviews given by
experienced consumers who have already used the food and lodging services surveyed by
the site. Recently, WellPoint Inc., a prominent health insurer in the U.S., has announced it
would team up with Zagat—a purveyor of consumers’ restaurant and hotel ratings— to let
health-plan members go online to rate and review their experiences with doctors. See
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Women to Watch (A Special Report) —- The 50 Women to Watch, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at R3 (describing the work of female leaders in top Internet
companies).
91. Equality – both in terms of access to information and in terms of expression
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more equally on the Internet to sellers and consumers alike, the strength of
the claim for asymmetry of access to information mediums weakens.92
c. Limited Accessibility to Information
The asymmetry of information between sellers and consumers is
apparent in the allocation of information itself. Sellers control virtually all
available information regarding their offered products’ characteristics,
ingredients, safety, applicability and features, whereas consumers—even as
a collective group—hold only the information available from their
accumulated experiences. Often, accumulated experience is not enough to
discover all there is to know about the product.93 Sellers choose what to
tell consumers and how to tell it, and this choice, channeled through
commercial speech, encompasses most of the available product
information.
opportunities – was indeed one of the originally arguments in favor of the Internet. As early
of 1996, John Perry Barlow stated that, “We are creating a world that all may enter without
privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth;
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter
how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity.” John Perry Barlow,
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
(Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. Every consumer is free
to contribute to public discourse from his experience and to voice his opinions on any seller;
and every seller may respond to the criticism through the same venue. Some Internet sites
offering consumer reviews, also initiate on-line discussions between consumers and sellers,
archived and presented for the benefit of future consumers.
92. This claim requires a disclaimer: despite the democratic structure of Internet
accessibility, asserting that the Internet abolishes the informational asymmetries between
sellers and consumers would be an overstatement. In fact, Internet users typically rely on
few content sites, ultimately granting the owners and editors of such sites an inherent
advantage in terms of commercial speech exposure and persuasion power. Obviously, the
power of owners and editors of a popular site is asymmetrical to that of an individual
consumer criticizing the contents of such a site because the platform for the latter criticism
is less popular and gives users less exposure. Given these actual use patterns of consumers,
it seems that the Internet is a virtual reflection of the traditional power and capital relations
in the society, rather than an equal democracy of opinions. Nonetheless, the Internet does
give consumers a platform for documenting their experiences and opinions in an irreversible
form that may reach other, future consumers; as such, the Internet gives consumers a larger
stage than ever before.
93. The abrupt decline in sales after news of a product scandal, or product recall, best
demonstrate the effects of this asymmetry. To illustrate, consider toys that include
poisonous lead, putting the children playing with them at risk. Consumers’ accumulated
experience is not likely to discover such defects efficiently, because each individual
consumer has considerable transaction costs to conduct private research. However, the
producing seller holds all information about the product’s ingredients and safety from the
production date, and is in the lowest-cost position to detect and survey the product’s voyage
through the marketing chain.
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Here too, the Internet is revolutionary, allowing accessibility and
immediate availability of masses of information, including opinions of
previous consumers, to all consumers at any given time. The information
accumulated on the Internet is visible to all, and is a shared asset of Internet
users throughout the world, crossing nationalities, cultures, and
generations. Consumers have much better accessibility to information
thanks to the Internet, but they do not know all there is to know.94
d. Limited Reliability
The final barrier to information sharing between past and present
consumers is overcoming the reliability question and assuring the integrity
of the information shared. Suppose all our needs for information were
present in customer reviews available online; could we trust these as
authentic and reliable? This question is harder to answer because disguised
marketing, e.g., astroturfing or undercover marketing,95 is playing a
significant role in the marketing strategies of corporations. Astroturfing is
particularly prominent online, as chat rooms and forums for consumers
easily mislead their users to perceive everyone as peers. Disguised as
authentic consumers who give sincere advice, sellers can affect future
consumers and promote their sales while they are protected by the veil of
anonymity at a very low cost and with a low risk of liability.96

94. Not all the essential information is available on the Internet, and even the available
information requires vast resources for processing and analysis. To illustrate, consider a
purchase of an automobile: most consumers will want to know the total cost of ownership of
the car, a price accumulating the average cost of maintenance as well as the miles per gallon
expected utility. Even a thorough investigation of all information sources available on the
market would not reveal this information, which is held exclusively by the seller.
95. See Eur. Parl. & Council Directive 2005, supra note 89, at 34.
96. A well-known published example of undercover marketing is Sony Ericsson, who
used stealth marketing in 2002, hired actors in major cities, and had them ask strangers to
take their picture with a brand new picture phone while talking about how cool the new
device was. Robert Walker, The Hidden (in Plain Sight) Persuaders, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Dec. 5, 2004, at 68. Undercover marketing can affect encyclopedias, as well as
Wikipedia, which is a consumer-updated source of information, an encyclopedia based on
the wisdom of the crowds, is, too, subject to manipulation. Subjects of negative consumer
reviews can push content below the fold by adding their own content to the top of their
Wikipedia page, to push the authentic negative information down, or bury the negative
information by masses of positive marketing propaganda to create information overload and
noise and to make information retrieval harder for consumers. See Jessica Bowman, What
To Do When Your Company Wikipedia Page Goes Bad, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 27,
2007, 9:46 AM), http://searchengineland.com/what-to-do-when-your-company-wikipediapage-goes-bad-11572 (explaining the breadth of marketing ideas for blurring past
consumers’ authentic reviews).
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2. Sellers’ Commercial Speech
Most analyses of sellers’ incentives for disclosure assume perfect
functioning of the market. Under the assumption that product quality is
reflected in prices, a key result in the literature on disclosure states that
sellers are likely to voluntarily disclose product information; more
specifically, sellers are likely to voluntarily disclose all information that
can be verified without cost.97 In particular, sellers are likely to voluntarily
disclose product information as a means of differentiating their own
product and/or brand from others available on the market.98 The intuition
behind this result is that if the seller does not disclose product information,
he will not be able to charge surplus for the additional quality provided. In
the absence of information about product differentiation, consumers are
expected to assume similar levels of quality for competing products; hence,
sellers of above-average products are incentivized to disclose further
information in order to distinguish their products from their lower-quality
competitors.99 Theoretically, this scenario may result in a reversed
“lemons” process100: if consumers assume non-disclosing sellers are
offering lower quality products, more and more sellers would disclose to
associate themselves with higher quality products. More sellers would
disclose and the process would repeat itself until all types (except the
lowest of quality) disclose. Such process is expected to lower the average
level of non-disclosing sellers, until every seller discloses.101 Disclosure is
97. This result is rooted in the assumption of perfect functioning of the marketplace
rule. If prices fully reflect quality, sellers have incentive to disclose information about
product quality so that they can charge adequate prices for their product. Absent such
disclosure consumers will not pay the stated price since they would assume the worst about
the product’s value. Thus sellers, except those offering the lowest quality, have an incentive
to voluntarily disclose information regarding their product. If disclosure is costly, sellers
are expected to voluntarily disclose only if their quality exceeds a threshold. See W. Kip
Viscusi, A Note on ‘Lemons’ Markets with Quality Certification, 9 BELL J. ECON. 277, 27779 (1978) (discussing quality certification as an option for high-quality sellers in certain
markets); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J.
FIN. 323, 323-27 (1980) (explaining that sellers will always distinguish themselves if there
is no transaction cost).
98. See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private
Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 464-65 (1981) (supporting the
proposition that high-quality sellers have an incentive to voluntarily distinguish themselves).
99. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503-06.
100.
See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Varying Effects of Predatory
Lending Laws on High-Cost Mortgage Applications, 89 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV.
39, 43-44 (2007) (putting forth the “reverse lemons” hypothesis in the context of the
mortgage market).
101. See Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about
Product Quality, supra note 97, at 39 (implying that regulatory intervention in disclosure is
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considered an effective measure because a key theoretical study predicts
that if informed consumers reach a critical mass, sellers in sufficiently
competitive markets will have an incentive to cater to the needs of these
informed buyers and thus confer benefits to the non-informed consumers as
well.102
However, product quality is only reflected in prices if the market
functions efficiently,103 and such efficient functioning requires rational,
deliberating consumers, who are actively searching, processing and
comparing product knowledge, and in turn, can translate their product
knowledge into product quality and finally into price. When consumers
fall short of this standard and fail to understand sellers’ disclosures,
disclosure is less likely to occur voluntarily: under such conditions, sellers
of higher quality products will not be able to distinguish themselves from
sellers of lower quality products, and low-quality sellers will have
incentives to hide their quality.104
Despite these theoretical assertions, empirical studies show that the
predicted theory of voluntary disclosure is not validated in practice. For
example, in a study of salad dressing labels conducted in the U.S. prior to
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act’s105 mandatory disclosure
requirements, only 9% of firms selling high fat salad dressing chose to
disclose fat content on the product’s label, whereas all sellers of low fat
salad dressing voluntarily disclosed.106 Sales of high fat dressings
eventually declined after regulatory intervention that imposed mandatory
disclosure rules.107 Other empirical studies examined the effects of
completely unnecessary as eventually all sellers would disclose to signal quality). It is also
backed up by some empirical works: George Benston, for example, compared the pre- and
post-legislation disclosure made by firms prior to the adoption of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An
Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144-45 (1973)
(finding that no significant price effect resulted from the new mandated disclosure and
concluding that voluntary disclosure prior to the act was sufficiently efficient).
102. Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
103. THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY E. ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN LENDING: THEORY,
HISTORY, AND A WAY FORWARD 27 (2011)
104. This scenario is typically called market for lemons, since the marketplace rule
applied here creates a race to the bottom on product quality: no seller has incentives to
invest in higher quality products when higher quality cannot translate to higher prices. See
generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488-500 (1970) (explaining the market for lemons).
105. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, §§ 1-10, 104
Stat. 2353-67 (1990) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2014)).
106. Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices:
An analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2000).
107. Id.
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informed minorities, showing that only about one in one-thousand online
shoppers chose to become informed and read the contract, a number far
below the critical mass Schwartz and Wilde seek.108 These empirical
studies also found that increasing contract accessibility does not result in an
economically significant increase in readership or a sufficient number of
informed consumers to create an informed minority.109
Indeed, models that examine how the market functions for product
information given to consumers who do not understand disclosures predict
that, if the number of informed consumers is insufficient to deter lowquality sellers from disclosing and overcharging, the threat of losing the
informed consumers’ business is too weak.110 In the resulting equilibrium,
low-quality sellers are expected to charge a price commensurate with high
quality sellers. As Fishman and Hagerty state, “with no informed
customers, price cannot signal quality.”111 Sellers might not disclose
positive or negative product information due to insufficient incentives.112 A
seller is unlikely to disclose positive information relevant to all brands in a
certain category because the disclosing seller would both share the benefits
of disclosure with its competitors and solely carry the advertisement
costs.113 Likewise, sellers are not likely to disclose negative information
108. A key theoretical result predicts that if informed consumers reach a critical mass,
sellers in sufficiently competitive markets will have an incentive to cater to the needs of
these informed buyers and thus confer benefits to non-informed consumers. See Alan
Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 659-62 (1979) (explaining that
information problems in consumer markets raise difficult issues regarding how to determine
and fix market imperfections). See generally Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler &
David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics
Approach to Standard Form Contracts, (N.Y.U Ctr. for Law, Economics and Organization,
Research Paper No. 09-40, 2009) (casting doubt on the “informed minority” hypothesis,
which holds that in competitive markets, an informed minority of buyers who are termconscious is sufficient to discipline sellers from using unfavorable boilerplate terms).
109. See Mathios, supra note 106.
110. See generally Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus
Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 45, 53 (2003) (analyzing the benefits and disadvantages of rules mandating the
disclosure of sellers’ information). Understanding a disclosure, in this regard, means
understanding its implications. A consumer can be aware that a disclosure has been made,
and that the information is available, without comprehending its consequences and
implications. For example, a consumer may observe a nutritional food label without
comprehending the health consequences associated with consuming the food.
111. Fishman & Hagerty, supra note 110, at 45, 53.
112. See generally Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 31 (examining the
complexities of how to properly and efficiently inform consumers and the ways in which the
legal system has attempted to solve this issue).
113. Disclosures of category benefits may be beneficial enough to overcome this
externality in cases of a monopoly or a large market share.
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about a certain brand in a particular product category since such a
disclosure would be expected to benefit all substitute suppliers, while no
particular seller is likely to internalize the benefits of the disclosure.114
Sellers are likely to count only their own profits as a benefit, and they do
not count the additional profits obtained by other firms and the additional
consumer surplus. From the individual seller’s perspective, a free-riding
externality can be beneficial to society. In determining what information to
disclose, a seller is likely to ignore these benefits and balance only its
individually attained, internalized benefits against the costs of providing
information.115 The result is undersupply of product information.116
The practice of obscuring the available information, often in the form
of hidden add-on prices, thrives “even in highly competitive markets, even
in markets with costless advertising, and even when the shrouding
generates allocational inefficiencies.”117 To illustrate this argument,
consider the consumer credit market. Since credit information tends to be
complicated, consumers are typically imperfectly informed regarding the
credit products they purchase. 118 Sellers, who provide that credit, are in a
position to become the cheapest providers of information. Provision of
voluntary information could be used to correct mistakes of consumer
misperception. But, as Bar-Gill and Warren show,119 insufficient incentives
and the collective action problem are significant obstacles for such
voluntary consumer education:
If seller A reduces this risk and invests in educating consumers
about the benefits of her superior product, then seller A will
attract a lot of business and make a supracompetitive profit. But

114. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503-04 (discussing free-rider
problems).
115. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 507-09 (explaining that the
incentive to disclose optimally can be restored if sellers obtain sufficient market power to
capture most of the benefits of the information). Market power can stem “from a
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure or from a perceived monopoly caused by
differentiation” of the seller’s brand from other competing products.” Id. at 504. While
they supply better incentives for consumer information disclosure, these market structures
are imperfectly competitive and inevitably create other imperfections in the performance of
the product market. Id. at 491-539.
116. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 504 (“The general effect of these
externalities [the free-rider problem] is to lead to an undersupply of general information.”).
117. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 505 (2006).
118. Barr-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 8-11.
119. Barr-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 11-20. See also John Y. Campbell,
Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1554 (2006) (describing the collective action problem
that prevents sellers from educating consumers in the mortgage market).
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this is not an equilibrium. After seller A invests in consumer
education, all the other sellers will free-ride on seller A’s efforts.
They will similarly reduce the product risk and compete away the
profit that seller A would have made. Anticipating such a
response, seller A will realize that she will not be able to recoup
her investment. Seller A will thus be less likely to improve the
safety of her product, and instead will continue to offer a higherrisk product.120
Board suggests that sellers may choose not to disclose, despite a
competitive environment, if disclosure would result in fiercer competition
with rivals.121 If one high quality firm chooses to disclose, others must
trade off the increase in competition and resulting fall in price if they also
disclose, with the effect on sales and reduced product quality, as perceived
by consumers, if they do not disclose.122 If the sales’ effect and perceived
decrease in product quality outweigh the increase in competition, the seller
will prefer not to disclose.123 However, when some high quality sellers
choose not to disclose, this may generate a positive externality for low
quality sellers.124 These low quality sellers may pool together and take
advantage of consumers’ misperceptions of quality levels.125
Undersupply of product information can also result from the products’
public good properties. This occurs when information used by consumers
generates an external benefit to uninformed consumers.126
These
uninformed consumers shop randomly and enjoy the higher quality induced
by the patronage of informed consumers.127 This externality implies that
not enough information will be produced, even in an otherwise efficient
market.128
Another market failure in the supply side of product information
involves reliability: there is not always sufficient incentive to supply
truthful information. False positive claims and/or withholding of negative
information can be beneficial to a seller, and thus considered optimal, if
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 18.
Oliver Board, Competition and Disclosure, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 198-99 (2009).
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally MURALI PRASAD PRANTA, BUSINESS, CONSUMER AND THE
GOVERNMENT: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 25 (2001) (discussing public good
properties of information and its under supply amongst consumers)
127. Id.
128. See generally Steven Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 Am.
Econ. Rev. 240, 240 (1976) (arguing that when consumers have imperfect information, the
market structure is not perfect competition, but rather, monopolistic competition).
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consumers can sustainably believe them.129 False advertising as a strategy
can be worthwhile, especially for sellers of material products that involve
ad hoc purchases and do not require long-term relationships with repeating
consumers. Online consumer reviews are one means of mitigating the risk
of false advertising because sellers of material products are often rated on
retailer websites for their reliability.130 However, as Bar-Gill and Warren
note, this may only be a partial solution since consumers must still
subscribe some publications, like Consumer Reports, and, most
importantly, read the reports.131
The difficulty of supplying reliable information poses a significant
hurdle when sellers lack a standardized measure or benchmark against
which products can be compared. In many cases, sellers’ voluntary
disclosure means little without a backdrop to compare the underlying
product whose features are disclosed. One example is the securities
market. A company’s statement regarding its expected return on investment
is meaningless to a potential investor without a benchmark measure of
industry or market performance for comparison.132 For this reason,
129. Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 505-06.
130. eBay is one prominent example. eBay offers consumers the opportunity to rate
sellers on four different categories: accuracy of the item description; consumer satisfaction
with the seller’s communication; shipping time for the item; and reasonableness of the
shipping and handling charges. Seller Ratings, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/help/
feedback/detailed-seller-ratings.html Sellers are rated on a five star scale on each of these
four categories, with five stars being the highest rating and one star the lowest. Id. In
addition, consumers leave detailed narratives of their experiences and go into more specific
depth. Id. Detailed seller ratings are anonymous, and sellers cannot see which buyer gave
them a certain rating. Id. Consumers are thus free to be open about their buying
experiences.
131. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 14-15.
132. CLYDE P. STICKNEY, ROMAN L. WEIL, KATHERINE SCHIPPER, & JENNIFER FRANCIS,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 244 (9th ed.
2000) (describing how to analyze and use a standard financial statement in order to make
informed financial decisions). Stickney et al. explain that a similar argument is made for a
uniform accounting standard for investors:
Readers may have difficulty answering questions about a firm’s profitability and
risk from the raw information in financial statements. . . . Ratios aid financial
statement analysis because they conveniently summarize data . . . [but] [r]atios,
by themselves out of context, provide little information. For example, does a
rate of return on common shareholders’ equity of 8.6 percent indicate
satisfactory performance? After calculating the ratios the analyst must compare
them with some standard . . . [such as] [t]he corresponding ratio for a similar
firm in the same industry . . . [or] [t]he average ratio for other firms in the same
industry[.]
Id. at 233-34. But see, Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do they Justify
Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 703 (2004) (arguing that the comparative
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securities regulation requires mandatory uniform conventions for financial
statements and sees this mandatory uniform convention as central to its
purpose133
Without mandatory standards of disclosure, every seller would
disclose in her own terms, language and format. This would lead to market
dynamics in which sellers would have no credible disclosure capacity or
technology, as well as insufficient public quality assurances. Under such
dynamics, as Akerlof’s model of market for lemons suggests, only the
average quality of the goods will be considered and fairly priced by
consumers, and above average quality products will be driven out of the
market.134
At the other end, market failures on the supply side of product
information create incentives for information overload. Sellers are
incentivized to provide and disseminate more information, as long as their
own cost in so doing does not exceed their expected gain.135 Since sellers
gain when consumers switch brands, they are expected to provide further
information aimed at incentivizing consumers to switch to a different
brand, while losses occur for competitors and society as a whole.136 Under
such constraints, the losses to competitors can exceed the consumer surplus
from switching brands, and the result is the overprovision of information.137
The possibility of information overload is further enhanced by an
incentive to use abstract and vague commercial speech. In general,
competition is expected to skew toward the easily observable
characteristics of products.138 Sellers are thus incentivized to invest in
brands and signals, rather than in technical, detailed descriptions of the
product’s characteristics, since these are the factors that affect consumer
choice.139 This process is a generalization of a lemon’s equilibrium in the
markets.140 If vague and abstract commercial speech is more easily
observable and memorable by consumers, sellers have no incentive to
advantage for investors may not always justify mandatory disclosure because firms may
voluntarily disclose information to obtain information about other firms).
133. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-9 (5th
ed., 2006), (discussing continuous disclosure and other disclosure provisions).
134. Akerlof, supra note 104, at 488-490.
135. Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 509
136. Id.
137. Id. at 508-09.
138. One example is a car dealership that sells used cars. If cleanliness of cars is more
easily observable and comparable by potential buyers, cleaner cars are expected to sell at a
premium. Therefore, sellers are incentivized to over-invest in cleaning their inventory of
cars, rather than investing in hidden, or less observable aspects of their underlying product
quality. Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 31, at 511.
139. Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 510.
140. Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31 at 510.
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invest in educating consumers regarding the true, detailed nature of their
products. As a result, sellers do not invest in educating consumers.141 This
creates an information environment that results in spurious product
differentiation and branding premiums, thus raising prices for functionally
equivalent brands.142
The frequent use of boilerplate terms and standard form contracts in
the consumer product market obscures product information through added
complexity and information overload. Through the artificial framework of
form contracts, sellers create an environment of high transaction costs for
informed consumer purchasers.143 As Gilo and Porat suggest, sellers might
achieve several goals through this artificial complexity and informational
overload, including:
segmentation of consumers and price
discrimination;144 stabilization of cartels and obstruction of competition;145
a façade of the consumer contract that disguises its true nature from
potential consumers and third parties;146 and a credible signal of nonnegotiability, that creates a self inflicted barrier on negotiation.147
B. Market Failure in the Demand for Product Information
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers “often fail to make
141. See generally, Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 17-20 (discussing why sellers
do not tend to educate consumers).
142. Beales, Crasewell & Salop, supra note 31, at 510.
143. See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard Form
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers and Anti
Competitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 986 (2006) (suggesting that sellers use
language as a screening method for unwanted customers and use a complicated contracting
process as a means to screen repeated consumers from other consumers, who cannot afford
to pay the high transaction costs of contracting, as well as the use of boilerplate terms to
create price discrimination when benefits and discount are hidden between the lines of long
contract language).
144. Id.
145. The complexity of terms creates higher transaction costs for consumers who want
to compare similar products by rival sellers. Thus, it leads to “an equilibrium in which
competition is less fierce, and profits [are], accordingly, higher.” Gilo & Porat, supra note
144, at 1006. As Gilo and Porat argue, the use of complex form contracts and boilerplate
terms to reduce competition is prominent and sustainable not only in monopolistic markets,
but also in oligopolistic ones, if the long-term loss from a price war outweighs the shortterm profit from price cutting. Id.
146. Gilo and Porat discuss cases where boilerplate terms in form contracts are used to
hide salient features of the contract, such as exit possibilities from a services contract or
insurance for high-risk products. Id. at 1014-15. In these cases, form contracts are used to
create a fair impression and thus provide sustainability of their terms for the respective
sellers, thereby minimizing the likelihood of a court intervention or negative public impact.
Id. at 987.
147. Id.
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rational decisions even within the bounds of the information they have
acquired.”148 While rational actors would actively search and process
product information and trigger competition that would make for an
efficient market, real-life consumers fall short of such ability, creating a
market failure on the demand-side of product information. Due to their
bounded rationality, bounded will power, and psychological reaction to
information overload, consumers often do not create sufficient disclosure
incentives for an efficient market of product information. In the following
section, I briefly survey some of the reasons for the demand side market
failure.
1. Information Overload
In product information, more can often become less. Having the
information is not enough: even if all potentially relevant information was
theoretically obtainable and verifiable through sufficient research efforts,
such availability is likely to have limited social effect. This is because the
resources required for comprehensive product research and analysis are
greater than the expected individual benefit that is likely to result.149 The
cognitive150 and emotional151 burdens placed on the consumer in evaluating
148. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1995) (citing evidence).
149. This conclusion follows from rational models of the decision process. For
example, according to one model, suggested by Stigler, a consumer is likely to invest in
studying the alternatives up to the point where the costs of additional research would be
higher than the surplus benefit expected. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213-25 (1961) (analyzing the economic effect on the market
of the search and identification of sellers and the discovery of their prices). Another model,
introduced by Simon, suggests that the choice between alternatives would be made by the
product’s compliance with the consumer expectations as defined ex ante: the consumer is
expected to choose not the best product, but rather the first sufficiently good product; that is,
the first available product that complied with her ex ante expectation. See Herbert A.
Simon, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 1-17 (3rd ed. 1976); see also Eisenberg, supra, note
148, at 211-25 (discussing limits on cognition that prevent consumers from making rational
choices).
150. Cognitive limitations are augmented by the complexity of the available
information, the varying reliability of the information’s sources, and its varying forms of
presentation. For a discussion of cognitive limitations, see Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral
Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 120 (2007) (applying
behavioral economic findings of cognitive limitations to challenge assumption of utility
maximization in contract law); James R. Bettman, Mary F. Luce & John W. Payne,
Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 187-217 (1998)
(developing framework of constructive choice given consumers’ limited processing
capacity); DeNisi & Elaydi, supra note 33, at 50 (discussing both cognitive biases and lack
of complete information in consumer decision-making); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty, supra note 33, at 1124-31 (explaining generally several cognitive biases
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the masses of available information are too heavy to instrument and allow
daily investigation of the various product alternatives, each with an
increasing number of data regarding complex characteristics schemes. On
an individual level, the costs of such analysis per product exceed its
expected benefits.152
Indeed, empirical research suggests that when available information
exceeds the consumer’s information processing capacity, the consumer has
difficulties in identifying the relevant information,153 exercises increased
selectiveness in processing available information, thereby ignoring a
significant portion of it,154 confronts difficulties in identifying the
relationship between details and overall perspective,155 requires more time
to reach a decision,156 and generally reaches a suboptimal decision that
compromises the accuracy of her autonomous choice.157 The benefits of
present in individual decision-making and judgment of an outcome’s likelihood).
151. Consumers conduct emotional trade-offs when making a choice. See Luce,
Bettman & Payne, supra note 33 (discussing the importance of emotional trade-offs in
decision-making and what makes some trade-offs more emotionally difficult than others);
Lisa Watson & Mark T. Spence, Causes and Consequences of Emotions on Consumer
Behaviour: A Review and Integrative Cognitive Appraisal Theory, 41 EUR. J. MARKETING
487 (2007)(explaining how an integrated cognitive appraisal theory can be used to
understand the causes of emotions).
152. Empirical literature calls this phenomenon “information overload” and defines it in
several ways, all pointing to the masses of available information beyond what an individual
subject’s cognitive and emotional capacities allow her to process. See generally, Paul A.
Herbig & Hugh Kramer, The Effect of Information Overload on the Innovation Choice
Process: Innovation Overload, 11 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 45 (1994) (discussing
information overload).
153. Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Contested Issues, 14
J. MARKETING RES. 569 (1977).
154. See generally. Herbig & Kramer, supra note 153, at 46 (explaining that information
overload can have adverse effects on consumers’ decision-making abilities); Claudia
Klausegger, Rudolf R. Sinkovics & Huan “Joy” Zou, Information Overload: a Crossnational Investigation of Influence Factors and Effects, 25 MARKETING INTELLIGENCE &
PLAN. 691, 709 (2007) (demonstrating negative correlation of information overload with
fulfillment of job responsibilities); Paul R. Sparrow, Strategy and Cognition: Understanding
the Role of Management Knowledge Structures, Organizational Memory and Information
Overload, 8 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 140, 144 (1999) (discussing how, when
faced with large volumes of information, managers tend to neglect large portions of
information and try to punctuate its flow in predictable ways).
155. Susan C. Schneider, Information Overload: Causes and Consequences, 7 HUM.
SYS. MGMT. 143, 143-53 (1987).
156. Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 432,
433 (1984).
157. Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J.
CONSUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982). See also Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the
Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436,
436-40 (1984) (showing empirically that consumers can be overloaded and defining limits
on the number of alternatives and attributes that consumers can process without
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acquiring product information often fail to exceed the costs.158
Once information overload is detected, it is interesting to ask why
consumers do not demand simple and accessible disclosure. For an
individual consumer, the costs of making such a demand outweigh its
potential benefit159, and collective action problems160 make a public claim
hard to achieve. Moreover, voicing a concern about accessible information
requires some awareness of the costs and mal-effects of information
overload, and such awareness may be present in fewer consumers than
those who need informational protection. Optimism and overconfidence
make it natural for many consumers to trust their ability to process product
information rather than acknowledge that the effort required is not
reasonable, even if potentially possible to overcome.161 Demanding that
sellers simplify their information entails an acknowledgement of one's own
limitations, imposing a psychological cost on consumers making such a
request.162

experiencing the dysfunctional consequences of information overload); see also Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1220 (2003) (discussing generally behavioral economic theory of
choice). One question arising from this (concise) description of information overload’s
effects is the definition of accuracy in consumer decision-making. An underlying
assumption of the dysfunctional effects of information overload seems to be that the
consumer’s aim is preconceived and predetermined before she begins to consider her
purchase opportunities. This assumption seems to be partially incorrect because consumers
do not always know in advance exactly what they want. Recent studies in cognitive
psychology show that people’s ability to forecast their future happiness (or utility, in
economic terms) is contingent and partial. See DANIEL TODD GILBERT, STUMBLING ON
HAPPINESS 18-19 (2006); Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection:
Experiencing the Future, 317 SCI. 1351, 1352 (2007) (explaining the various conditions that
must be met in order for a person’s present hedonic experience to be a reliable predictor of
their future hedonic experience). Hence, the accuracy of an actual consumer choice is to be
determined in relation with a dynamic model of our preconceived desire, rather than a static
preconception of the desired good. Since this dynamic model of desire conception is also
affected by the context within which the choice is made, including the information
environment, information overload may affect the consumer’s perception of the desired
good, making the discrepancy between the preconceived desire and the actual choice harder
to detect and to measure.
158. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 181 (1968) (analyzing formally how costly information is to
acquire).
159. Id.
160. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the collective action problem
in the consumer community).
161. See supra Part II.B.2, notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
162. For a detailed explanation of this cost, see infra Part II.B.2.
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2. Optimism and Overconfidence
Consumers are unrealistically optimistic and systematically fail to
accurately evaluate risks and probabilities of success.163 Nearly ninety
percent of drivers believe they drive better than average,164 while ninetyseven percent of consumers believe that they are either average or above in
their ability to avoid accidents with bicycles.165 Even when consumers are
explicitly warned about product risk, they are unlikely to internalize and
incorporate such risks in their consumer choices.166 For example, only
three percent of consumers who were informed of the risks associated with
bleach and drain cleaner considered their home to present an above-average
risk for hand burn and child poisoning from the use of drain cleaner, gas
poisoning, or injury to children from the use of bleach; half of the
consumers believed their house to pose average risk, while the other half
believed their house was lower than average risk.167 Since consumers fail
to understand and internalize products’ risks and the likelihood of their
occurrence, they are not likely to pay for better, safer products, which is
necessary in order to form a competitive market that will create sufficient
incentives for suppliers to invest in minimizing the risks.168
3. Framing and Rules of Thumb
For efficient functioning of the market for product information, it is
necessary to assume invariance—i.e., that a consumer’s choice between
two options should not depend on how such choice is characterized and

163. This is a well-documented human fallibility. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806,
806 (1980) (discussing surveys concerning automobile accidents, crime, and disease that
suggest people are unrealistically optimistic about the future).
164. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?,
47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981).
165. W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 95-106 (1987). Overconfidence and
optimism are documented across all aspects of life. For example, people who were about to
get married were overconfident about their divorce-related prospects as compared to the
rates of the entire population; even when the median of respondents predicted that fifty
percent of the population gets divorced, the median of respondents predicted their own
chances as zero percent. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is
Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993). In general, most people think they can do better than others
and perceive themselves as immune from hazards and risks.
166. See VISCUSI AND MAGAT, supra note 165, at 93-97.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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presented, or framed.169 Rational consumers should not be affected by
different presentations of the same information; rather they should be able
to drill down to the essence of the information, and take all relevant facts
into account.170
Real-life consumers, however, rarely fulfill this
criterion.171
One example of the framing effect is loss aversion. A series of
experiments showed that when something is framed as a loss, it is generally
perceived as being more costly than if it were framed as an equivalent
absence of gain; this is because rather than assigning specific values to
objects, people vary in their value estimation based on the default, or baseline allocation.172 Other prominent examples of the framing effect are
systematic biases, or heuristics, which were identified by Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s.173
Tversky and Kahneman
demonstrated that anchoring, availability, and representativeness
systemically bias human judgment.174 Anchors influence consumer choice
by suggesting a starting point for the thought process: Tversky and
Kahneman show that people’s decisions are influenced significantly by the
immediate figure, question, or experience preceding the decision169.
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 4 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000) [hereinafter, Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice].
170. Id.
171. Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, at 210 (noting that consumers’ actual
behavior often violates invariance); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (discussing
the effects of the different ways of framing problems on preference) [hereinafter Tversky &
Kahneman, Psychology of Choice].
172. Consider this experiment: a class is randomly divided into two groups. Half the
students are given a coffee mug and the other half are instructed to try to trade for their
classmates’ mugs. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1330-31
(1990). Efficient market functioning and utility theory would predict that mugs would end
up spread randomly in the class because the group who gained them as a default would trade
with the other group, so that the result would be even distribution of the mugs between these
two groups (there is no reason to assume an inherent preference for the mugs within the first
group, as the class is divided randomly). However, loss aversion and the framing effect
make for a completely different result. Id. at 1343. The group that received the mugs
requires twice as much as others are willing to pay for it. Id. at 1338.
173. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208-09 (1973) [hereinafter Tversky
& Kahneman, Availability] (discussing the subjective biases that result through the use of an
availability heuristic); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 33 (discussing systematic error in
commonly-used heuristics, including representativeness, availability of instances or
scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor).
174. See Tversky & Kahneman, Availability, supra note 173, at 208-09 (providing an
overview of a study showing the impact of anchoring, availability, and representativeness on
human judgment).
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making.175 Human judgment in general, including consumer choice, is
considerably influenced by the comparable data and scenarios available to
the memory or imagination.176 Finally, Tversky and Kahneman show that
people tend to base decisions on some subset of data they judge to be
representative, leading to systematic erroneous judgments.177 In the
product markets, the subset of the relevant data that is used as a shortcut to
a comprehensive search for the facts is often the brand name.
These works show that, rather than making independent decisions that
are isolated from their context, humans use rules of thumb for their
decision-making, subjecting the resulting choice to deep influence by ways
in which alternatives are framed. Therefore, framing plays a meaningful
role in consumer markets. In a variety of consumer contexts, sellers use
framing effects to increase prices and reduce efficiency and consumer
welfare. To illustrate, consider the effects of “add-on” pricing practices:
sellers artificially divide products to several different charges, advertising a
base price for a product and then offer additional “add-ons” at the time of
sale.178 Even in e-commerce involving search engines, which can be
expected to be highly competitive, sellers create artificial complexity and
obfuscate product information so as to increase sales based on consumers’

175. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 33, at 1128-29
(discussing anchoring effects)..To illustrate, consider this experiment: subjects were asked
two questions: (a) How happy are you? (b) How often are you dating? When asked in this
order, the correlation between the responses for these two questions was quite low, but when
the question order was reversed, so that the dating question preceded the happiness question
the correlation jumped significantly (from 0.12 to 0.66). Fritz Strack, Leonard L. Martin &
Norbert Schwarz, Priming and Communication: Social Determinants of Information Use in
Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 429, 437 (1988).
176. See Taversky & Kahneman, Availability supra note 173, at 207-09 (discussing the
availability heuristic. The availability heuristic is commonly demonstrated by decisions to
buy insurance: the spatial and temporal proximity of disasters is most influential in that
regard, such that consumers typically choose to hedge, or buy insurance, against familiar
and easily accessible risks. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra
note 33, at 1128 (discussing how the ability to imagine a future event impacts and risktaking).
177. See Taversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 33, at 112427 (providing a general discussion about representativeness). Representativeness is the
tendency to judge the likelihood of an event based on its similarity to a present event, while
ignoring other relevant facts; or, the tendency to judge characteristics of an object based on
its similarity to an image or stereotype. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick,
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 49-50 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
178. Consider examples such as: a printer and ink, a hotel and Internet connection, and a
flight and airport taxes. See Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing, 120 Q.J. ECON. 585
(2005) (discussing various examples of firms using add-ons).
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confusion and bounded rationality.179 Spiegler shows that, in general,
sellers respond to the bounded rationality of consumers with an increased
effort to obfuscate, rather than with more competitive pricing.180
The result is that the surrounding narrative of a product sales point
significantly influences consumer choice, thereby creating a market failure
on the demand side of product information. Sellers, in turn, have
incentives to create a manipulative environment during the selling
experience, using the framing effects and heuristics in branding techniques
in order to influence consumer choice, rather than providing consumers
with legible and easily comprehendible product information, as rational
consumers would require.
4. Bounded Will-Power
Market failure on the demand side of product information often occurs
despite consumers’ awareness of their interests—due to psychological,
rather than cognitive, limitations. Real-life consumers often make choices
that the rational consumer would avoid because their will-power does not
suffice for better decisions, which would require actively searching for and
comparing the alternatives.181 This occurs when consumers mindlessly
choose products, follow the herd in their purchases, or fail to alter the
situation and prefer the default option they are using.182
Rational consumers would always prefer more options.183 Real-life
consumers are, however, often made worse off by a multitude of
alternatives because they cannot resist the temptation to consume products
that are readily available, or immediately satisfactory, while being harmful

179. See Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price
Elasticities on the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 438 (2009) (discussing obfuscation and
the possibility that many firms use intentionally confusing websites in order to trick
consumers who use search engines).
180. Ran Spiegler, Competition Over Agents With Boundedly Rational Expectations, 1
THEORETICAL ECON. 207, 219-220 (2006).
181. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 12 (explaining that imperfectly rational
consumers might not seek out information because they do not think that they need more
information or because they think the unknown information is “trivial, irrelevant, or
insufficiently important to justify the cost of its acquisition.”).
182. See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 12 (positing reasons for why
consumers may remain uninformed about products).
183. This conclusion follows from rational models of the decision process, see supra
note 149 and accompanying text; see also Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman & Wei
Jiang, How Much Choice is Too Much? Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in
PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, 83, 84 (Olivia
S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004) (discussing the historical presumption that
consumers perceive more choice as better).
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in the longer term.184 Empirical works repeatedly show that humans
systematically fail to self-regulate their consumption when tempted or
manipulated by suppliers.185 Psychologists distinguish between two
processing systems, which correspond to intuition and reason.186 These
two-system models of processing are mostly referred to as System 1 and
System 2.187 Decisions relying on System 1 processes often rely on a
spontaneous, automatic, un-conscious process and correspond to
intuition.188 Decisions relying on System 2 processes are deliberate,
controlled, skillful, and correspond to intellectual reasoning.189 It is System
1 that we seek to restrain in order to fulfill our longer-term goals.190
Consumers often make decisions mindlessly, without allocating
sufficient processing resources to access cognitions related to System One.
For example, in one study, respondents chose between two alternatives: a
chocolate cake, “associated with more intense positive affect but less
favorable cognitions,” versus a fruit salad, “associated with less favorable

184. A classic example for such a need is that of Ulysses, who instructed his crew to tie
him to the mast so that he could listen for himself but be restrained from submitting to the
temptation to steer the ship closer. HOMER, THE ODDYSSEY 275 (Robert Fagles trans., 1997).
185. Food is a good illustration of the difficulty of resisting temptation: otherwise,
obesity would not have occurred so frequently in the Western world. Consider, for
example, the following experiment: subjects were given free buckets of stale popcorn in a
movie theatre. Half the subjects received big buckets, while the other half received
medium-sized buckets. Recipients of the bigger bucket ate 53% more stale popcorn. See
BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE THINK 16-18 (2010)
(showing the lack of will-power when presented with stale popcorn). People tend to eat
what is readily available rather than deliberate on the food’s merits. For a general
discussion of obesity and market manipulation, see Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1647 (2004).
186. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51.
187. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51.
188. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51 tbl. 2.1.
189. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51 tbl. 2.1.
190. Or, in order to fulfill our autonomous desires. A key concept that requires
deliberation here is that of autonomy. Since both System 1 and System 2 decisions stem
from the same subject, it is philosophically important to justify our preference for one over
the other. One way to define autonomy is as a relationship between individuals’ actions and
their preferences, and between individuals’ preferences and their selves. Essentially,
autonomy is defined here as a consistency between one’s self (as accorded by her desired
preferences) and one’s behavior. Note that the underlying assumption here is that the set of
preferences is separate from the “self.” Essentially, this view defines autonomy as
consistency between two layers of the “self,” the core self and a set of preferences that is
presumably detached from that core. This assumption was severely criticized as artificial
and farfetched. See, e.g., Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, 4850 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (discussing theoretical view of agency that utilize this
assumption and proposing an alternative theoretical view of agency – “the deep self view”).
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affect but more favorable cognitions.”191 Findings from such experiments
suggest that if processing resources are limited, spontaneously evoked
affective reactions, rather than cognitions, tend to have a greater impact on
choice.192 As a result, the consumer is more likely to choose the alternative
that is superior on the affective dimension, but inferior on the cognitive
dimension (e.g., chocolate cake).193
5. Status-quo Bias and Short-sightedness
Making decisions is costly: it is time consuming, and requires
cognitive effort and deliberative energy. Thus, most people tend either to
stick with the current situation or to prefer their original choice over and
over again.194 For some choices, such as a breakfast menu or running trail,
sticking to the original choice makes sense. For others though, inability to
change and preference to the current may turn very costly.195 Because
consumers lack the energy to change their decisions, sellers have incentives
to create honey traps that are structured aggressively as great bargains for
the short term and that require high opt out costs.196 Consumers’ preference
for the status quo is related to their shortsightedness in evaluating the
alternatives they are offered. Thinking of the longer term costs of product
maintenance requires complex calculation and cognitive effort. Sellers
have incentives to structure their product as a great bargain, offering a
lower purchase-price to hide the high maintenance and usage costs.197 By
the time consumers become aware of the actual cost of the product, the
costs consumers incur to change their usage habits ultimately deter the
191. Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of
Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 288 (1999).
192. Id. at 288.
193. Id. at 278.
194. This effect is commonly referred to as the “status quo bias.” See, e.g., William
Samuelson & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (documenting empirically the “status quo bias”).
195. A good illustration for the costs of inertia is failure to update the investment
portfolio of pension plans throughout a career, so that the investments for the pension retain
the default contribution rate and fund allocation. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The
Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON.
1149, 1184–86 (2001).
196. This strategy is commonly used in many industries. Credit cards offer a first year
free of annual fees, magazines offer great bargains for the first few months, cell phones are
offered as great bargains if consumers commit to stay as customers for 3 years, during
which the seller has sole discretion to change the fees.
197. See, e.g., Jim Rendon, Much More Than Just ‘Maintenance,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/realestate/getting-started-much-more-than-justmaintenance.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the costs of condos in New York are often
accompanied by high monthly maintenance fees).
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consumer from changing products; as a result, the seller may reap higher
prices.198 Legal intervention may be justified as a means to overcome this
bias, inform consumers of the total costs of ownership, and of the temporal
alteration options, as well as to set efficient defaults for complex product
choices.
C. Sustainability Reporting
Recent trends in corporate governance reflect an abundance of
corporate “sustainability” reporting – in addition to the established
financial reports based on accounting standards – that focus on the
corporation’s environmental and social impact. A study by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCI) suggests that 499 of the
500 corporations in the S&P 500 made sustainability disclosures in a
financial filing, or linked financial performance to a sustainability
initiative.199 This indicates that corporations may be willing to
communicate voluntarily with investors on a variety of topics – including
more than those required for disclosure in compliance with the federal
securities laws.
Sustainability reporting is significant because it creates a wider scope
of information for investors that includes benchmarking and assessment of
non-financial performance measured by a uniform format developed by the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)200 and voluntarily adopted by many
corporations.201 However, even close adherence to the GRI standards of
disclosure would not promote consumers’ freedom of choice or the
efficiency of the consumer products market. Sustainability reporting is
made for investors rather than consumers because it is not product-specific
and does not compare the material information about products offered by
198. This strategy is commonly used in software sales. Software is often sold at a
bargain or given free with high costs for technical support and service, so that the total costs
of ownership are much higher than the apparent purchase price. See Raj Sabhlok, Open
Source Software: The Hidden Cost of Free, FORBES (July 18, 2013, 10:00am), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rajsabhlok/2013/07/18/open-source-software-the-hidden-costof-free/ (noting that free open-source software may be cost-effective, but has “ongoing
maintenance and support [costs] as well as the up-front development [costs]”).
199. PETER DESIMONE, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SUSTAINABLE
INVESTMENTS INST., INTEGRATED FINANCIAL AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE UNITED
STATES
5
(2013),
available
at
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_
Financial_Sustain_Reporting_April_2013.pdf.
200. Mission and Vision, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting
.org/Pages /default.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
201. See, e.g., DESIMONE, supra note 199, at 109 (noting that Southwest Airlines’ 10-K
stated that the company “undertakes voluntary investigation or remediation of soil or
groundwater contamination at several airport sites.” (internal citations omitted)).
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material categories.202 Therefore, sustainability reporting’s materiality
stops at the investor reporting level. Sustainability reporting is a significant
step in the development of corporations as good citizens, but has no impact
on their role as sellers in real life.
D. Third Parties’ Commercial Speech
Product information cannot be sufficiently supplied by third party
information providers, such as consumers’ unions, because of the nature of
product information as a natural monopoly, which creates a free rider
externality.203 Since information collected and generated by professional
third parties can be disseminated at low marginal cost (i.e., a natural
monopoly), and consumers can redistribute purchased information to other
free rider consumers, economic theory predicts a professional third party is
expected to produce less than efficient amounts of information, as its
profits will not enable internalization of the real demand to its information
processing service.204
In reality, as in economic theory, third parties and consumer unions do
not seem to sufficiently address the difficulty of informational darkness in
the consumer products market. The impartial product review published by
Consumer Reports is a partial solution, but it only considers a limited
number of categories of products and it compares only a few of the
available brands for each product surveyed.205 While providing a
significant service, third parties are not a thorough solution to the problems
of product information.
Third parties that provide information must bear the costs of the
information search, verification, and analysis (and, occasionally, pricing).
Regulation may be justified as a means to reduce these costs. As these
costs decrease, the number of third party agents and information traders is
202. See Jeff Civins & Mary Mendoza, Corporate Sustainability and Social
Responsibility: A Legal Perspective, 71 TEX. B.J. 368, 369 (2008) (noting that corporations’
sustainability programs typically include “strategic planning; corporate policy and goals and
procedures to implement them; infrastructure; a code of conduct; standards, manuals, and
guides; stakeholder communication, including dialogue and reporting; performance and
appraisal metrics; and line responsibilities.”).
203. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503 (discussing the costs of
consumer protection regulation). Consumers’ ignorance benefits sellers on average also due
to the sub-optimal use of products by ignorant consumers); see also supra notes 114-116
and accompanying text (discussing the how the free-rider problem leads to a dearth of
information for consumers).
204. Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503.
205. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 504 (discussing a speech of third
parties and Consumer Reports). Business initiatives such as Kamaze and the like may be an
exception to this rule.
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expected to increase,206 and their contribution is expected to be more
precise.207 The cost of obtaining product information is minimal for the
corporation that creates it, but it is very expensive for the information
trader who is an outsider seeking to uncover nonpublic information. This is
especially true with regard to complex products that often require extensive
research in order to reveal their true nature and characteristics. Without
mandatory disclosure, information traders are bound to engage in duplicate
efforts to reach the same information and uncover it only partially.
Mandatory disclosure may be justified as a means to lower and subsidize
these costs.
Uniform disclosure duties can be justified as a means to improve and
enhance the competition between information traders and third party
information providers, and as a means to reduce the entry barriers to the
market of information trading in the products market.
Requiring
corporations to disclosure product information to their consumers can
effectively subsidize search costs for consumers, facilitate a competitive
market for information traders of product information, who may offer
similar services to those offered by Consumer Reports, and enhance
consumer market efficiency and consumers' freedom.
III.

CONSUMERS’ CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP

A. Consumer Organizational Membership
Corporations should be accountable to consumers for their products’
information because of the nature of their relationship with their
consumers. Most consumer contracts are constructed very similarly to
organizations208: consumers purchasing a cell phone, entering a health
insurance program, signing up for a daily paper, or ordering cable
television are each signing a form contract, but simultaneously subjecting
themselves to the rules and procedures of the seller’s corporate
organization. It is a long and well-established truth that consumers do not
really negotiate agreements with corporate providers.209 Instead, consumers
206. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 66, at 741–43.
207. This argument is assuming that mandatory disclosure lowers the effect of noise
traders and associated noise risk. See id. at 738–39 (discussing the risk of estimating
undiscoverable undisclosed information).
208. Menachem Mautner, Judicial Intervention in the Contents of Contracts and the
Question of the Future Development of Israeli Contract Law, 29 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 17,
30-35, nn. 28, 38 (2005).
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631–32
(1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.

AZGAD-TROMER_ FINAL (ARTICLE 5).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

274

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/15/2015 5:30 PM

[Vol. 17:1

simply choose to enter into a contractual relationship governed completely
by the terms of the corporate entity, and during the term of the contract,
corporate providers often control all aspects of the relationship.210
Corporations are for-profit organizations formed by their shareholders
who seek to maximize earnings while isolating the risks through their
limited liability status. Scholars of Organizational Behavior often define an
organization as a social system of collaboration that strives to maintain or
achieve a common goal or objective.211 Since corporations constantly
change their business activity and goals over time, it has been suggested
that the organizational goal is simply one of continued survival and
perpetuation.212 In general, organizations are distinct from other social
entities.213 First, organizations are formally recognized by a governmental
agency.214 Often the organization is created by official documents, such as
charters, articles of association, bylaws or statutes that are filed with the
state’s bureaucracies.215 Second, organizations are distinct in their
boundaries.216 Members of the organization may choose to enter an
organization, and may choose to exit it.217 While contracted with it,
though, they are subject to its rules and regulations, as well as to its culture
and ethics base.218 Boundaries are a key element of organizational culture,
and often significant resources are devoted to their maintenance and
REV. 1174, 1224–25 (1983).
210.
See Rakoff, supra note 209, at 1224 (noting that firms “do not want to negotiate
individualized contracts because doing so entails bearing not only the costs of the particular
negotiations, but also the economic and institutional costs of modifying an organizational
structure geared to the standardized terms.”).
211. However, the goal pursuit definition is incomplete as many members of the
organization do not share the ultimate goal that the organization was formed to achieve.
Corporations are typically formed for profit maximization, but many of their stakeholder
members, including consumers and employees, do not share that original goal and are not
committed to it. JERALD GREENBERG, MANAGING BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2010);
JEFFREY PFEFFER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
7 (1997) [hereinafter PFEFFER, NEW DIRECTIONS]; JEFFREY PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS AND
ORGANIZATION THEORY 125-26 (1982) [hereinafter PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS]; W. RICHARD
SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 23-24 (1992).
212. See Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS supra note 211, at 7.
213. Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 7.
214. Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 7.
215. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (“Any . . . corporation . . . may
incorporate . . . under this chapter by filing with the Division of Corporations in the
Department of State a certificate of incorporation. . . .”).
216. Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 9.
217.
See Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 9 (stating that “maintenance and
demarcation” of boundaries are important in organizations).
218. See Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 9 (noting that, while
“organizational boundaries are clearly permeable . . . permeability is to some degree under
the control of the organization.”).
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demarcation, as membership with the organization is an indicator of class
and social status.
The typical nature of the corporate relationship with its consumers
resembles corporate organizational membership more than it does a
contract, and this suggests that corporate law is the more appropriate legal
platform for protecting consumer rights. Mautner suggests that consumer
contracts resemble organizations in three key manners219: first, as members
of a corporation, consumers choose to enter into their relationships with the
seller; second, as members of a corporation, consumers choose to exit their
relationships with the seller when they end the consumer contract;220 and
third, as members of a corporation, consumers are not able to negotiate the
terms of engagement with the seller, but rather subject themselves during
the contract period to the seller’s complex web of rules and regulations of
social control.221
Consumers are often subjected to corporate rules and regulations
during the term of their contract. Consider, for example, a parent’s contract
with his or her daughter's preschool. While the parent opts into the
agreement voluntarily, once contracted, the entire relationship is set
through the preschool’s management, which often sets careful procedures
to manage the content and form of the daughter’s daily life and to manage
the parent’s ability to opt out and end the relationship. Most technological
products set similar boundaries for their consumers, who can choose to
purchase and use the product as pre-programmed by the corporate provider,
but are not allowed to amend any of its features. Even a standard contract
with a health insurer is typically so overloaded with information and
includes so many fine-print details that the outcome is the same: the
consumer can choose either to purchase or not to purchase the coverage
offered, but its terms are unilaterally set by the corporate insurer in its sole
discretion and may include any number of exclusions.222
While contracts are conceived of as arrangements supposedly
219. Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35, nn. 28, 38.
220. Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35 nn.28, 38. Interestingly, commentators note that
corporations often impose a capital lock in provision on their investors. Margaret M. Blair,
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the
Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV., 387, 388-89 (2003). Lynn A. Stout argues that the
nature of the corporation can be better understood by focusing on its capacity to lock in
equity investors’ initial capital contributions by making it far more difficult for those
investors to subsequently withdraw assets from the firm. A corporation is much easier for
equity investors to get into than to get out of. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of
Corporations, U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 253-67 (2005).
221. Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35 nn.28, 38.
222. See, e.g., Cigna Healthcare Policies, CIGNA, available at http://www.cigna.com
/cigna-healthcare-policies (last visited, Dec. 9, 2014) (providing an extensive list of policies,
each with its own paragraph description).
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mutually agreed to by all parties, organizations have preconceived
constructs that are typically prefixed at the moment of a particular agent’s
entry and are harder for the member to change or affect otherwise.223 The
rules and culture of the organization are a means to achieve social control
and coordination between its members. Given that consumers are rarely
negotiating parties in control of the details of their arrangement with the
seller, their relationship with sellers resembles organizational membership
more than it resembles classical contracts: by purchasing the product,
consumers choose to consume the product under a detailed set of terms and
conditions prefixed by the corporate seller. At the moment of purchase, the
consumer does not mutually agree to the terms of the consumer contract,
but rather subjects herself to the corporate seller’s organizational culture,
rules, and procedures in providing the service or product hoped for.
B. Stakeholder Theory
Corporate accountability towards consumers is based on the premise
that corporations are established to create social value rather than merely
profit for shareholders.224 Although the conventional analysis of corporate
law is focused on reducing agency costs created from the divergence
between management, owners, and controlling and non-controlling owners,
stakeholder theory refuses to see shareholders as the ultimate beneficiaries
of corporate law, but instead sees them as owners of a residual interest in
its profits.225 A stakeholder approach to business defines the corporate
purpose as creating as much value as possible for all stakeholders,226
classically defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected
by the achievement of the organization's objectives.”227 Under the

223. Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35, nn. 28, 38.
224. Charles Handy, What’s a Business For?, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 49, 51-52 (2002).
225. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 260 (explaining how some economists
define the firm as a bundle of assets under common ownership where control is delineated
ex ante to hired inputs by explicit contracts, while the owners retain residual control and
profits).
226. One recurring theme in stakeholder theory literature is the definition of a
stakeholder. The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) refers to the group without whose
support the organization would cease to exist (including shareowners, employees,
customers, suppliers, lenders and society). See R. F. Stewart, J.K. Allen & J.M. Cavender,
The Strategic Plan, Research Report 168, Stanford Research Institute, Long Range Planning
Service, Industrial Economics Division (1963). Slinger holds that the term refers to all
those who have a “stake” in the corporate enterprise and contribute to the success of its
business. See G. Slinger, Essays on Stakeholding (1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Cambridge), quoted in R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF
THE ART 47 (2010).
227. FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 46; R. EDWARD FREEMAN & JOHN MCVEA, A
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stakeholder mindset, business is seen as a set of relationships between
groups that have a stake in the activities of the organization. Accordingly,
the stakeholder approach evaluates a corporate seller based on more than
just profit maximization to its shareholders; rather, it is evaluated based on
how consumers, suppliers, employees, financers (including bondholders
and banks), communities, and shareholders interact to create integral value
together.228 The role of management is to shape and manage these
relationships and to balance divergent interests for the firm's benefit.229
Two famous diagrams demonstrate the juggling of management between
different stakeholder constituencies.

STAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 189 (Michael A. Hitt et al. eds,
2001).
228. See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 68 (noting that stakeholder analysts
focus on “all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise”
(emphasis original)).
229. Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 79.
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Blair and Stout view a corporation as a team of participants who
enter into a complex agreement to work together for mutual gain.230 The
corporation is a coalition of members seeking a premium on its opportunity
costs through collaboration with the team.231 Corporate law is the default
set of rules for such cooperation, reducing transaction costs for ad hoc
contracting between various members.232 Stakeholder members of the
corporation are thus yielding power over key outputs and inputs to the
shared body of cooperation, delegating authority for dispute resolution and
for allocation of assets and liabilities to a board of directors acting as
trustees of different stakeholders, and aiming to maintain a productive and
efficient coalition despite diverging interests between the various groups.233
Blair and Stout support their view with the language and procedures of
corporate law, under which the board of directors owes a fiduciary duty to
the firm, a fictional personality, rather than to the shareholders.234 Under
U.S. case law, directors are generally subject to liability only for conduct
that harms not only the shareholders but other stakeholders as well.235
Since U.S. based public corporations typically have no controlling
shareholder, but rather are owned by dispersed shareholders, many boards
of U.S. public corporations are independent; thus, Blair and Stout limit

230. See Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 285-87 (noting how the mediating hierarchy
model suggests that shareholders of public companies give up control in hopes of sharing in
the benefits that can come from team production).
231. Id. at 285.
232. Id. at 289 n.90.
233. Id. at 285.
234. Id. at 298.
235. Id. at 299.
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their argument to public corporations, while private corporations may
adhere to the principal-agent conventional analysis of corporate law.236
Stakeholder accountability theory is rooted in ideas about corporate
social responsibility that emerged in Europe in the inter-war period (19181939) when few large stock corporations dominated the economies of the
west. The rise of managerial agents as prominent organs of the
corporation, whose owners are passive and widely dispersed, raised the
question of managerial agents’ accountability. In a series of public
correspondences between Adolf Berle and American corporate lawyer E.
Merrick Dodd published in the early 1930s, Berle argued that the fiduciary
duties of managers should be enhanced to prevent the preference of
controlling groups of shareholders over minority groups.237
Dodd
suggested that once the corporation is an independent entity separate from
its owners, rather than an aggregate of stockholders, “[t]hose through
whom [a corporation] acts may therefore employ its funds in a manner
appropriate to a person practising a profession and imbued with a sense of
social responsibility without thereby being guilty of a breach of trust[,]”
suggesting a view of the corporation not as a purely private enterprise but
as a wider organization with social responsibilities and obligations.238 By
the 1950s, shareholder primacy was seen as “slightly old fashioned,”239 and
managers were conceived of as in charge of balancing the interests of
different groups connected with the “soulful,” socially responsible
corporation.240 In the 1960s, corporate managers were described as
“administrators of a community system,” explicitly rejecting shareholder
primacy.241 Shareholder primacy returned to dominance with the rise of
neoliberal ideology in the financial markets of the 1980s and 1990s. 242
236. Id. at 281.
237. Adolf Berle, Note, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365 (1932).
238. E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV
1145, 1161 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Is the Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties
of Corporate Managers Predictable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 194-207 (1935).
239. L.C.B. Gower, Shareholder Democracy: A Broader Outlook for Corporations, 68
HARV. L. REV. 922, 927 (1955) (book review).
240. Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON.
REV. 311, 313-14 (1957).
241. BRYAN HORRIGAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
DEBATES, MODELS AND PRACTICES ACROSS GOVERNMENT, LAW AND BUSINESS 89 (2010)
(citing Adolf A. Berle, The Corporation in a Democratic Society, in MANAGEMENT AND
CORPORATIONS 1985 63, 68 (M. Anshen and G. Bach eds., 1975)); cf. Wilber G. Katz,
Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J.L. & ECON. 75, 82 (1960) (countering that
the “only statutes and cases which suggest any departure from [shareholder primacy] are
those relating to gifts [that] provide no basis for Professor Berle’s general assertion that
[directors are] . . . ‘administrators of a community system.’”).
242. Paddy Ireland & Renginee G. Pillay, Corporate Social Responsibility in a
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Fiercely believing in the forces of the market as efficient and as the primary
facilitator of wealth, neoliberals acted toward the goal of deregulation in
order to free the forces of the free market from governmental
intervention.243 Shareholders in this period were less dispersed and were
represented by few institutional investors, and claims for shareholder
activism and shareholder value got stronger.244
While shareholders of large corporations in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century were often personally involved in managing or
monitoring the corporation, at the beginning of the twentieth century
owners of corporations’ stocks became typically uninvolved in
management or production, assuming a passive role and becoming widely
dispersed, taking little interest in the daily management of the business.245
In the twenty-first century, corporations are not only owned by dispersed
owners, but also have a larger global impact than governments, with
consumer communities dispersed between various nations and lands.
Nothing in the contractual relationship between consumers and sellers
resembles the nineteenth century negotiation of a consumer with a small
merchant at the town marketplace. The seller is now not owned by an
individual, and the buyer is not asking any questions or making any
requests. But the law for provision of consumer product information
remains the same. The radical reconceptualization of the corporation as a
public institution, which suggests that directors owe duties to employees,
consumers, creditors, and society as a whole, as well as to shareholders,
may not be so radical when considering this historical change.246
One significant hurdle that stakeholder theory needs to overcome
to become legally applicable is providing a concrete methodology for
balancing competing stakeholder interests. The business judgment rule
protects board decisions from judicial second-guessing when acting in good
faith, with due care, and in a manner it reasonably believes is in the
company’s best interests.247 However, protecting consumers’ informational
interests may inherently conflict with shareholder value. A 2010 Delaware
Chancery Court decision in Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark
suggests board accountability standards in for-profit corporations include
Neoliberal Age, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE:
TOWARDS INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT? 78 (Peter Utting & Jose Carlos Marques eds., 2010).
243. Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242, at 85.
244. DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM 286-91 (1997).
245. Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242, at 77, 80.
246. Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242, at 77, 80.
247. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). Boards may not
pursue corporate policies that are untethered from the corporation’s business interests—
revenues, profit, equity value and related matters concerning relationships with customers,
suppliers, employees and other stakeholders. See id. (noting that board decisions will not be
interfered with as long as they can be attributed to any rational business purpose).
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acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders, which, in that case, involved striking down a “poison pill”
designed by the board to preserve organizational culture.248 Indeed, the
concept of a for-profit corporation implies a deeper accountability to
shareholder value.
Viewing the corporation as a nexus of contracts implies a need for
an evaluation model for stakeholder interests and their strength. In
perfectly efficient markets, both principals and agents are able to enter and
exit organizational contracts at will if we assume an infinite number of
contractual alternatives.249 But in our imperfectly efficient reality, often
agents are not able to enter and exit freely their contractual
commitments.250 This results in power differentials between agents due to
unequal corporate dependence between the parties.251 In balancing
between conflicting interests of stakeholders, board members may assess
the flexibility of the corporate organizational boundaries.252 In efficient
markets, easy entry into the organizational relationship and smooth exit
from it seem to require a lesser degree of corporate accountability. Entry
and exit barriers that make the market inefficient, however, seem to call for
accountability towards the relevant group of stakeholders.253 Interestingly,
under this power differential model shareholders in publicly traded
corporations are actually the least in need of regulatory protection because
they can easily exit their relationship with the corporation by selling their
stock. In contrast, corporate accountability to consumers, should be
required to be higher than corporate accountability to investors, as
consumers are often bound by form contracts that have lock-in periods or
other high exit barriers.254
Stakeholder theory implies accountability only towards contractual
parties to the corporation.255 It is thus significant to note its distinction
from corporate social responsibility, which calls for enhancement of
corporate accountability towards external parties that are foreign to the

248. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that in this case preserving corporate culture is
in directors’ self-interest).
249. Charles W. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 29 J. OF MGMT.
STUD. 131, 135 (1992)
250. Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 135.
251. Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 135.
252. See Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 146-47 (suggesting ways for corporate boards
to reduce the concentration of stakeholder power).
253. See Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 134-35 (noting that power differentials created
by inefficient markets “materially affect both the content of principal-agent contracts and
the structure of governance mechanisms policing those contracts.”).
254. See discussion of exit barriers, supra Part I.E.
255. See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 68 (stating that stakeholder theory is
concerned with those who are involved in the enterprise).
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corporation’s business.256 Like the Once-ler in “The Lorax” who
rationalizes his corporation’s destruction of the environment by stating
“How ba-a-a-ad can I be? . . . a portion of proceeds goes to charity,”257
corporate social responsibility provides corporations with a narrative of
societal consciousness that allows them to rationalize harmful corporate
behavior. Indeed, under this trend, corporations fail to return their debts to
creditors on the one hand, while giving charity donations on the other.
Corporate social responsibility allows tax deductions for the—often
minor— expense and provides great public relations value. “All the
customers are buying,” tells us the Once-ler, representing the evil in
capitalism, “and the PR people are lying.”258
Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, is a methodology of
corporate accountability towards specific groups deeply involved with the
corporation and its activity, including its investors as well as its employees,
suppliers, and consumers.259 Stakeholder theory rejects a soft law approach
and calls for specific normative implications. Typically, the corporate
moral hazard takes the form of a set of voluntary standards imposed by
corporations as an ethical code of principles published by the management
and self regulated by the corporation in question.260 Integrating social and
environmental concerns in corporate business operations on a voluntary
basis creates limited incentives for legal compliance and thereby often
remains a tool of marketing with limited effect on actual performance. 261
For example, the Christian Aid Report, Behind the Mask: The Real Face of
Corporate Social Responsibility, lists a string of transgressions by
international business lobbies that “vigorously oppose” their corporate

256. See Alexandra R. Harrington, Corporate Social Responsibility, Globalization, The
Multinational Corporation, and Labor: An Unlikely Alliance, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 483, 489-90
(2012) (discussing how corporate social responsibility entails responsibility to a broad range
of subjects).
257. DR. SEUSS’ THE LORAX (Universal Pictures 2012).
258. Id.
259. See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 68 (noting that stakeholder analysts
focus on “all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise”
(emphasis original)).
260. See, e.g., Code of Business Conduct, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, (April 2009),
available at http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/45/59/f85d53a84ec597f74c754003450c/
COBC_English.pdf (providing Coca-Cola’s official code of business that includes topics
such as: acting with integrity around the globe, integrity in the company, integrity in dealing
with others); see also Colin Crouch, Modeling the Firm in its Market and Organizational
Environment: Methodologies for Studying Corporate Social Responsibility, 27 ORG. STUD.
1533, 1542 (2006)(arguing that corporations have an incentive to manipulate stakeholder
theory and corporate social responsibility to achieve their own ends).
261. See Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242 at 94 (“CSR is often treated by corporations as
little more than a public relations or window dressing exercise”).
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social responsibility commitments,262 including: Shell Corporation, who
officially strives to be a good neighbor but “fails to quickly clean up oil
spills that ruin villages”; British American Tobacco, who stresses its
commitment to high standards of health and safety but is reported to have
“chronic ill-health related to tobacco cultivation”; and Coca-Cola, who
states that it uses “natural resources responsibly” but is claimed to have “a
wholly owned subsidiary in India [being] accused of depleting village wells
in an area where water is notoriously scarce.”263
The challenge of making corporations accountable to their
stakeholders is wrapped up in the issue of how to make accountability
meaningful, measurable, and enforceable, bringing the value of free choice
back to the consumer shopping experience. In Individual and Corporate
Social Responsibility,264 Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole discuss three
alternative visions of corporate social responsibility. Vision 1 is the “winwin” approach, under which the incentive for corporate social
responsibility stems naturally and inherently from the promotion of
shareholders’ interests in profits.265 When firms fail to accommodate
corporate social responsibility, they in fact reduce shareholder value by
focusing on the short term.266 For example, Bénabou and Tirole bring up a
firm that may reduce costs by reneging on a contract with its labor or
suppliers so as to reduce costs, thereby damaging the long-term goodwill of
the different constituencies, making it more difficult to attract motivated
employees in the future, or induce suppliers to make long-term
investments.267 Corporate social responsibility under this first vision is in
fact a means by which a corporation can maximize profits and enhance
shareholder value in the long run.268
Bénabou and Tirole label Vision 2 “delegated philanthropy.”269
Under this view, a firm is a channel for expression of different
constituencies, and the corporation’s management caters to demand by
supplying the stakeholders’ need in charity while maximizing profit.270 As
Bénabou and Tirole point out, one needs to explain why the corporation is

262. CHRISTIAN AID, BEHIND THE MASK: THE REAL FACE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, 20 (2007), available at http://baierle.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/behindmask.pdf.
263. Id. at 2.
264. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77
ECONOMICA 1 (2010).
265. Id. at 9.
266. Id. at 10.
267. Id. at 9-10.
268. Id. at 10.
269. Id. at 10.
270. Id. at 11.
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the adequate social vehicle for this philanthropy.271 As an alternative, for
example, Starbucks’ consumers could send the workers in a coffee
plantation some donations through a charitable organization.272 The
explanation Bénabou and Tirole suggest is transaction cost savings.273
Since the corporation is already involved in the transaction with the
workers, it will be much cheaper for it to forward them the donation.274
Vision 3 is labeled by Bénabou and Tirole as “insider-initiated corporate
philanthropy,” and it reflects management’s personal need or willingness to
contribute money to a good cause, using “others’ money” for that
purpose.275
This article advocates for corporate accountability to product
information by considering the corporation in its role as a provider of
products or services to the public. Rather than a platform of delegated
philanthropy, or a means to enhance value for shareholders or managers,
the corporation is a legal institution that is granted legal privileges of
incorporation with limited liability, and against such privileges it should
incur accountability towards its consumers and not solely towards its
investors. If corporations are to be considered social institutions of
importance, and not simply assets of their owners, and if managers are to
be seen as more than agents of the shareholders, corporate governance must
be used as a mechanism for enhancing the voice of stakeholders and
271. Id. at 13.
272. Id. at 10.
273. Id.
274. Obviously, there is some circularity in this answer. There is no doubt that the
corporation can deal with the workers more efficiently and for less transaction costs, but the
real question is why do we use the corporate vehicle as a social means for charity to begin
with. Why do we find the corporate relationship we have with other stakeholder
constituencies to raise a justification for charity to begin with? In theory, if consumer
citizens are bothered by work conditions in Africa, they can collect and send money to the
group in need even if not directly in a relationship with them (one can assume workers for
Dunkin Donuts coffee enjoy no better terms of employment, and from a human rights
standpoint, there is no justification for why we should support only the workers working
directly on our personal cup of latte). The apparent answer is that we find a need to support
those in relationship to our actual lives, even if indirectly and through the channel of a forprofit organization.
275. Id. at 11. This vision is easily objectionable on corporate governance grounds. See
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 122. Recently, following the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), much
academic ado is credited to the issue of political donations conducted by corporations,
giving rise to questions of agency costs and management’s personal political agendas
promoted at the shareholders’ expense.. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides? 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 87-89 (2010) (noting that
corporate political spending is treated similar to ordinary business decisions and is delegated
to management).
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mitigating conflicts of interests between various groups that arise within
the corporate structure. In particular, corporate governance should impose
a standard of corporate accountability to product information that would
initiate adequate disclosure to consumers based on the power differential
test suggested above.
Not all consumers should be treated alike, however. Applying the
power differential test for corporate informational accountability implies an
organizational assessment of corporate boundaries and consumers’ exit
barriers from the relationship with the corporate seller.276 Exit barriers may
be contractual, as in cellular packages or utilities contracts, or natural, as in
preschool enrollment. Exit barriers are also highly correlated with product
risk: the higher the product's risk, the higher the probability the consumer
would be affected by its consumption for a long term. Consumption that
entails a long-term relationship with the seller should be accompanied by
higher informational accountability provided to consumers.
IV.

MEDIATING HIERARCHY APPLIED: CORPORATE
INFORMATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS CONSUMERS

Having established that consumers are legitimate corporate
members in need of better product information, this article proceeds to
sketch normative foundations for such corporate disclosure. Current
informational accountability under contract law applies freedom of
commercial speech, accompanied by liability imposed ex post by courts in
cases of fraud and misrepresentation. This ex post liability is insufficient.
This part of the article sketches a proposal for accountability standards that
match the challenge of corporations offering products or services to the
public.
A. Doctrinal Foundations: Comparing Corporate Law and Consumer
Contracts
Under current law, the relationship between consumers and
corporate sellers is categorized as contractual.277 Like small merchants in
the archaic marketplace, multinational corporations offering the public
services or products may design their commercial speech according to their
commercial interests, providing information only to the extent where
contract law would render the agreement involuntary.

276. See Charles W. Hill and Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 29 J.
MGMT. STUD. 131, 134 (1992).
277. See supra Part I.F.
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There are several reasons why this contractual categorization is
problematic: as discussed above in Parts I and II, the legal preference
toward investors is not justified by the factual characteristics of consumers
versus investors as a group, and freedom of commercial speech results in
an information environment that does not do enough to support freedom of
consumer choice. Contract law’s basic assumption is that horizontal
scheme exists between contracting parties that are in a mutual relationship,
however, the consumer-seller relationship is anything but mutual.278
Consumers are dispersed and the contractual categorization separates them
into separate individual relationships, despite the unified legal platform
used by corporations through form contracts.279 The institution for dispute
resolution in contractual relationships is the court, accompanied by ex post
resolutions coming at a high expense, which makes only class actions
plausible.
In considering the appropriate legal paradigm to set informational
accountability standards of corporations to consumers, it is useful to
consider the major differences between the legal disciplines of contract law
and corporate law. While both laws set rules for private parties acting in a
free market, they create distinct legal arrangements.
Under a corporate law regime, accountability brings about
settlement of the dispute at an earlier time because discussion of adequate
product disclosures is conducted prior to the sale, taking into account the
interests of consumers and their rights for informed choice. Rather than
waiting for consumers to sue based on the contract law claims of fraud or
misrepresentation, and apply the precedents ex post, corporate law offers an
ex ante policy to be adapted by the board of directors, an institution
balancing the need and interests of consumers with other stakeholder
groups, within the organization and given its specific circumstances.
While claims of fraud and misrepresentation under contract law are
standards interpreted by the court after the sale, corporate policy for
product disclosures set by the board of directors resembles rules: it is
specific and accurate, and its normative content is given prior to the sale of
the underlying product. Setting a product information policy by the board
of directors in advance may be preferable and more efficient. The board of
278.
See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999) (noting that courts “generally continue[] to
stress the classic concept of contract requiring two or more parties with capacity,
consideration, mutual assent, and a lawful subject matter,” but observing that this “classic
concept of contract” is “generally inapplicable to formal contracts or contracts under seal.”).
279.
For all practical purposes, these form contracts may be considered contracts of
adhesion. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 159 (4th Pocket ed. 2009) (defining adhesion
contract as “ a standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by another party
in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about
the terms.”).
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directors is an internal institutional organ possessing a broad view of the
business performance of the corporation on the one hand, and possessing
vast data on the product or service, on the other hand. The board of
directors has much cheaper access to information about the various
features, characteristics, and risks posed by products, as well as information
about other stakeholders’ interests and considerations regarding such
potential disclosures. No court of law would ever be able to delve into
these specific considerations as effectively as the board of directors. The
variety of products sold by most corporations also suggests that the proper
institution to address issues of product information should be the board of
directors rather than the court, which is not suitable for frequent similar
decisions.280 Letting the board of directors fulfill its role as a mediating
hierarchy allows better communication based on a common language
shared between various stakeholder groups, leading to higher certainty
about the rights and duties of each of the stakeholder groups and better
organizational cooperation.281
Typically, boards are considered to be accountable to the company,
to the shareholders, or to both.282 Recent trends in international corporate
governance, however, suggest dilution of the shareholder primacy norm,
making way for other stakeholder concerns. For example, the U.K., once
an established kingdom of the shareholder primacy norm, enacted new
regulations in 2013 under its 2006 Companies Act that require corporations
to include annual reviews about key performance indicators of their
business, including with regard to employment and environmental
matters.283 In 2013, India enacted a new corporate law that mandates that
public corporations establish a stakeholder relationship committee on the
board, requiring independent board members to “safeguard the interests of
all stakeholders.”284 The Canadian Supreme Court has ruled that board
members owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation rather than its
280. See Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
ECONOMICS 502, 510 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., Edward Elgar
2000) (expounding that rules are preferable as a normative methodology when frequent
policy decisions are required).
281. This argument resembles Schauer’s argument for rules over standards, due to the
function of rules as a semantic means of communication between the rule maker and the
public. See Frederick Schauer, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 53-64(1992)(explaining that the role of
rules is to communicate expected behavior to the intended audience).
282. See Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 298 (discussing the fiduciary duties of
directors).
283. The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations
2013, 2013, S.I. 2013/1970 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1970/pdfs/uksi_20131970_en.pdf.
284. The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India), available at
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf.
AND
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shareholders, in order to balance the interests of different constituencies.285
Chinese corporate law requires corporations to “observe social morals” and
to “assume social responsibility.”286 The prerogative of shareholders
remains to appoint members of the boards of directors287—occasionally
given limitations on professional qualifications (as in the case of
independent directors). But the accountability of the board of directors
should be extended towards additional stakeholders. Fiduciary duties of
board members encompass the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and the
obligation of good faith.288 Product information disclosure in the suggested
corporate pattern may be rooted in the duty of care and in the obligation of
good faith towards consumers as corporate stakeholders.
Timing is also of essence, and the board of directors is expected to
establish product information policy in advance, ex ante to the moment of
purchase, whereas the use of contract law postpones the time of dispute
resolution for ex post court discussions.
The following is a table summarizing the main differences between
contract law and corporate law, demonstrating why corporate law is more
suitable for imposing product information accountability.

285. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 618 (Can.).
286. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (全国人民代表大会常务委员会)
[Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384124.htm.
287. See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
605, 609 (2007) (identifying voting to elect directors as one of the rights of shareholders).
288. See Leo E. Strine Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 631 (2010) (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) to introduce and explain the duty of good faith, related
to the traditional duties of loyalty and care, owed by directors).
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A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF CONTRACT AND CORPORATE LAW

Contract Law

Corporate Law

Horizontal

Vertical

Dispersed consumers,
separated by numerous
individual form
contracts

Uniform relationship
with consumers, on
a single legal
platform

Ethical foundation

Mutual assent and
freedom of will

Stakeholder theory
and consumer
corporate
membership

Institution for
dispute resolution

Court of law

Board of Directors

Timing of Dispute
resolution
Liability
foundations

Ex post

Ex ante

Schematic
Description of
Relationship
Between Parties
Consumer
Dispersion

Remedy standard

Fraud/misrepresentation Adequate and
reasonable
disclosure
Damages, rescission
Damages under
and/or restitution
private enforcement
or public
enforcement as
applied in securities
laws and regulations
Management and
Board of Directors

Organizational
allocation of
Marketing staff
responsibility for
product disclosures
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B. Essentials of Suggested Product Disclosure
To redefine the informational relationship between corporate
sellers and consumers, a profound amendment of disclosure practices is
required. Avoiding fraud and misrepresentation is not enough. Product
information that is disclosed should become accessible, accurate,
comprehensive, and timely, and should allow consumers to fairly compare
material product features to those of competing products available on the
market. Under these guidelines, corporate sellers that offer or distribute
products and services to the public should be the individuals to disclose the
product information. Corporate law should be extended to include
mandatory disclosure duties of product information following the essentials
of materiality, accessibility and concise information. Disclosing the
information is not enough; corporations should ensure that information is
given concisely and includes all material aspects required for a reasonable
consumer to make her decision. Below, some guidelines are suggested for
product information policy, considering legibility of information disclosed
by the corporation, load of information available regarding the product,
lock-in provisions, the ease of exit from the consumer contract, and the
long-term costs of the purchase.
Further analysis is required to determine how to create incentives
for corporations to comply. Such research should compare patterns of
private enforcement tools, such as those available to investors securing
accurate filings and statements under the federal securities laws, and public
enforcement by a governmental agency in charge of product information
management similar to the SEC. Public enforcement may have the
advantage of setting a uniform scale and ranking system that would allow
easy comparison of products offered, as well as enforcing consistent
methodology of disclosure and location of information display.
Consumers, or the public agency on their behalf, should be able to sue a
corporation for inadequate product disclosure under corporate law even
when there is no contractual claim for fraud or misrepresentation, if the
disclosure provided for a particular product or service was not adequate
given the product qualification.
Based on the analysis of failures in current product information
markets given in Part II above, I provide three essentials for product
information disclosure below. Corporations selling products to the public
should be accountable for product information disclosure, including all
material information accessible and to the consumers’ public, in addition to
their liability currently holding under contract law for fraud and
misrepresentation.

AZGAD-TROMER_ FINAL (ARTICLE 5).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/15/2015 5:30 PM

CASE FOR CONSUMER-ORIENTED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 291

(1) Materiality
Product information disclosed must include all significant
information for consumers’ usage. Information disclosed
should be comprehensive and timely.
A range of
methodologies may be used to determine the significance of
features and data for the materiality test. One possible
approach is adopting GRI standards289 for materiality as
applied for consumers, taking into account the reasonable
estimates of impact on consumers’ product use and the
products' impact on the consumer's life. Materiality should
include long-term costs of purchase and any lock-in periods
imposed on consumers.
(2) Accessibility
Product information must be disclosed in an accessible manner
on the front of the product’s package and in any other
prominent source of commercial speech given on behalf of the
corporation, in plain English and with no cost, allowing
potential consumers to evaluate their purchase prior to
payment. Corporations should consider the legibility of product
information in assessment of its accessibility. Information
disclosed should be legible to the least sophisticated consumer
of the product, and accessible to all consumers and potential
consumers with no costs.
(3) Conciseness
Due to information overload environments, product
information disclosed should be succinct and sharp. Vague
statements and masses of information provided in intense
commercial speech environments should not be considered
adequate disclosure. Product disclosure should be succinct and
concise, simple and easy to understand. Simplicity and visual
clarity should convey all material information that reasonable
consumers need.
CONCLUSION
This article makes the case for the inclusion of consumers as
legitimate corporate stakeholders entitled to product informational rights.
Comparing consumers to investors shows that they have more in common
than the law recognizes. Consumers need at least as much informational
assistance as investors do, as shown by a comparison of the consumer
289. Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 200.
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choice process and the investment allocation process, the scope of risks, the
complexity of choice and its structural market settings, such as
intermediaries and regulation. This article analyzes voluntary commercial
speech environments and comes to the conclusion that the current market
for product information fails to provide consumers a meaningful
framework for efficient consumer choice. When consumers are considered
corporate members under an organizational analysis of stakeholder theory,
corporations will be considered accountable to product disclosure. Under
the suggested doctrinal outcome, corporate law would impose mandatory
disclosure duties of product information, applied to corporations that offer
services and products to the public. Consumers would be entitled to
reasonable and accessible disclosure of material product data provided by
the corporation in simple, easy-to-understand language. As compared to the
current contractarian view towards accountability for product information
disclosures, a corporate law view of accountability proves superior.

